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3 CRIMINAL CASE N 1-23/10 
I.  SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
 
An evaluation of the verdict in this case reveals violations of 
the defendants‟ human rights protected under Articles 3, 6, and 7 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.  In addition, other 
Convention rights also may have been violated.  The materials 
provided for use in this report, and the time allotted to complete it, 
were not sufficient to undertake a thorough analysis of these other 
issues.  Sacrificing breadth for depth, and in keeping with the 
request of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation for 
Civil Society and Human Rights, this report examines selected 
violations of the Convention that are most clearly identifiable in 
the verdict itself and in the conduct of the trial described in it. 
The conclusions of this report are as follows: 
1) The defendants‟ detention in the courtroom and the 
conditions of their confinement on remand during 
the trial court proceedings constituted inhuman or 
degrading treatment (Article 3). 
2) The proceedings exceeded a reasonable time 
(Article 6). 
3) The tribunal lacked independence and impartiality 
(Article 6). 
4) The verdict lacked indicia of a reasoned judgment 
(Article 6). 
5) The defendants were deprived of the presumption of 
innocence (Article 6). 
6) The defendants were deprived of their right to 
equality of arms (Article 6). 
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II.  REPORT BACKGROUND 
 
On 1 April 2011, an invitation was received via e-mail from the 
Presidential Council of the Russian Federation for Civil Society 
and Human Rights “to participate in an independent public expert 
analysis of official documents and proceedings in the recent 
criminal case concerning M.B. Khodorkovsky and P.L. Lebedev, 
who were convicted by a judgment announced on December 27, 
2010.”  The invitation stated that “[t]he Council hopes to obtain 
from you a written opinion with a focus on issues within your 
area(s) of expertise, although you would also be free to express 
your opinion on any other  legal question which you believe to be 
pertinent within judicial practice in connection with the case at 
hand.”  A response was requested by 30 April 2011.  
On 30 April 2011, the invitation of the Council was accepted 
via e-mail reply.  In the letter of acceptance, an indication was 
made that the legal analysis of the report would concern the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights.     
On 2 May 2011, the Council acknowledged via e-mail the 
receipt of this reply. A copy of the verdict was sent as an 
attachment to that e-mail and the website www.Khodorkovsky.ru 
was recommended as a useful resource from which to obtain other 
legal documents necessary for this expert report.  A copy of the 
expert report was requested by September. 
On 1 October 2011, this report was submitted to the Council.  
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III.  READER’S NOTE 
 
The European Court of Human Rights is not a court of appeal 
in the final instance from the decisions of domestic courts.  The 
Court‟s jurisdiction “shall extend to all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto which are referred to it[.]”  See Article 32 ECHR.  The 
Court‟s function is to identify violations of the Convention and, if 
necessary, to establish just satisfaction for them.  The Court has 
repeatedly observed that “it is not its function to deal with errors of 
fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in 
so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by 
the Convention.”  Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97 
(12 May 2000), at ¶ 34 (internal citations omitted).   
Given the diversity among member states party to the 
Convention, the Court has also adopted a doctrine that provides a 
margin of appreciation to national practices.  This report takes no 
position regarding Russian law other than to assess its conformity 
to the requirements set forth by the Convention.    
This report selectively identifies several violations of the 
Convention.  Under each heading, the report first sets forth the 
relevant provisions of the Constitution and Code of Criminal 
Procedure of the Russian Federation.  Second, the relevant 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights are provided.  
Finally, the report analyzes this law in light of the facts of the 
defendants‟ case and concludes whether the Convention could be 
said to have been violated.  Not every potential violation has been 
subject to the same degree of scrutiny or, in some cases, evaluated 
at all.  No judgment as to the merits of such claims is intended to 
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Following various tax inspections that began in November 
2002, the Tax Ministry of the Russian Federation concluded that 
the Yukos oil company had avoided the payment of a variety of 
taxes.  The Ministry found that this tax avoidance had been 
accomplished by the use of various subsidiary, trading, and 
holding companies that, although controlled and owned by Yukos, 
served to obscure Yukos‟s real business activity.  The Ministry 
also found that the trading companies served as intermediaries 
between oil production companies and oil processing and storage 
companies, all of which belonged to Yukos. 
On 20 June 2003, the first criminal investigation was opened 
concerning the Yukos oil company and its top management, who 
were suspected of fraud during the 1994 privatization of Apatit, a 
mining company.  As the European Court summarized the matter:  
 
In 2003-2004 the General Prosecutor‟s Office 
opened an investigation into the activities of several 
of the company‟s senior executives, including Mr 
Khodorkovskiy, Mr Lebedev, … and others. Some 
of them were arrested in 2003-2004 on suspicion of 
having committed large-scale fraud and 
                                                 
1
 These facts are drawn primarily from the verdict of 27 December 2010 by 
Judge V.N. Danilkin, presiding judge of the Khamovnichesky District Court of 
the City of Moscow; the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
arising out of applications by Mikhail Khodorkovsky (App. No. 5829/04 
decided 31 May 2011), Platon Lebedev (App. No. 4493/04 decided 25 October 
2007), Vasilii Aleksanyan (App. No. 46468/06 decided 8 December 2008), and 
OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos (App. No. 14902/04 decided 20 September 
2011); and the admissibility decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
arising out of the application by Platon Lebedev (App. No. 13772/05 declared 
partly admissible 27 May 2010).  Discrepancies between these sources and the 
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embezzlement of the shares of several Siberian oil 
refineries, including Tomskneft PLC. In particular, 
Ms S.B., one of the company‟s lawyers, was 
arrested. According to the Government, in her 
statement of 8 December 2004, confirmed in March-
April 2006, she testified that the applicant, as her 
manager, had instructed her in relation to the illegal 
operations with the Tomskneft PLC shares, qualified 
by the prosecution authorities as embezzlement.  
  
Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. No. 46468/06 (22 Dec. 2008), at ¶ 8. 
On 2 July 2003, Platon Leonidovich Lebedev was arrested 
while in hospital and sent to a pre-trial detention center.  The next 
day, he was remanded to a detention facility by court order made 
without the participation of Lebedev‟s lawyers. 
On 20 August 2003, the criminal investigation, which had been 
initiated on 20 June 2003, ended.  The case file contained 162 
volumes. 
On 25 October 2003, Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky was 
arrested in Novosibirsk and sent to Moscow.   
On 8 January 2004, a separate criminal investigation was 
opened on suspicion of fraud, embezzlement, and misappropriation 
by Yukos executives of the shares of several oil companies, 
including Tomskneft. 
On 15 April 2004, the Tax Ministry served Yukos with a tax 
assessment.  The Ministry found that Yukos had failed to pay 
certain taxes and ordered payment of over €2.8 billion in tax 
arrears, default interest, and penalty payments.  The order gave 
Yukos until 16 April 2004 to pay this amount.  However, by a 
decision of the Moscow City Commercial Court rendered on the 
same day that Yukos was served with a copy of the Tax Ministry‟s 
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this amount and the company was enjoined from disposing of 
certain assets in anticipation of a judgment by the court. 
On 16 July 2004, the defendants‟ trial began in the 
Meshchanskiy District Court of the City of Moscow.  On 16 May 
2005
2
, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were convicted of fraud 
(Article 147 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and Article 159 of the 
RF Criminal Code), causing property damage by deceit or breach 
of trust (Article 165 CC RF), and tax evasion (Article 198 and 
Article 199 CC RF) by a verdict of the Meshchanskiy District 
Court.  They were sentenced to nine years in prison.   
On 22 September 2005, the verdict was upheld on cassational 
appeal but the sentences were reduced to eight years in prison. 
On 29 March 2006, prosecutors sought authorization from the 
Simonovskiy District Court in the City of Moscow to initiate the 
prosecution of Vasilii Aleksanyan, then head of the legal 
department of the Yukos oil company.  According to the 
description found in the judgment of his application by the 
European Court of Human Rights: 
 
On 29 March 2006 the Deputy Prosecutor General 
requested the Simonovskiy District Court of 
Moscow to authorise criminal prosecution of the 
applicant in connection with his alleged 
participation in the embezzlement of the property 
and shares of several oil companies and refineries in 
1998-1999 (Tomskneft, Achinsk refinery, Eastern 
Oil Company, etc). The GPO [General Procurator‟s 
Office] claimed that in 1998-1999, when the 
applicant had been the head of the legal department 
                                                 
2
 In Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (31 May 2011) at ¶ 69, the 
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of Yukos, he had advised the company‟s executives 
and thus participated in their criminal activities. The 
shares in these companies had subsequently been 
“legalised” through a chain of financial operations. 
In their request the GPO referred to the materials 
from the criminal case, without, however, 
identifying them. 
 
Aleksanyan, supra at ¶ 15.   
On 4 and 5 April 2006, the court authorized searches of 
Aleksanyan‟s homes in connection with this request.  On 6 April 
2006, the court authorized the prosecution. 
On 4 August 2006, the commercial court of Moscow declared 
Yukos to be bankrupt and, with the consent of the leading creditor, 
Rosneft, a state-owned oil company, appointed a trustee to manage 
Yukos.  This decision was upheld by the 9th Commercial Court of 
Appeal on 26 September 2006.   
On 12 December 2006, the criminal investigation, which had 
been initiated on 8 January 2004, ended.  The case file contained 
113 volumes. 
On 5 February 2007, a second indictment, alleging 
embezzlement (Article 160 CC RF) and money-laundering 
(Articles 174 and 174.1 CC RF) by the defendants, was 
announced.
3
  The final version of the indictment lodged with the 
court and dated 14 February 2009 comprises fourteen volumes 
(3460 pages).  The crimes alleged in the indictment span roughly 
                                                 
3
 See e.g. BBC News, New fraud charges in Yukos case, 5 February 2007; RIA-
Novosti, Security tightened as ex-Yukos head returns to court, 5 February 2007.  
The indictment («обвинительное заключение») made available to the author of 
this report is dated 14 February 2009.  The discrepancy in date may reflect the 
final version of the indictment filed with the court pursuant to Article 215 of the 
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the same time period as the crimes for which the defendants were 
arrested in 2003 and convicted in 2005.  Both sets of crimes 
concern the defendants‟ conduct as executives of the Yukos oil 
company.   
On 25 October 2007, the European Court of Human Rights 
released its judgment concerning an application Lebedev filed 
about his detention and access to a lawyer.  The Court found that 
Lebedev‟s detention, in various ways, violated Article 5 § 1(c), § 
3, and § 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
On 12 November 2007, bankruptcy proceedings concerning 
Yukos concluded, at which time it ceased to have corporate 
existence. 
At a hearing held on 22 January 2008, Aleksanyan, who had 
been gravely ill with AIDS-related diseases, alleged that, on 28 
December 2006, investigator Karimov, who was in charge of the 
cases against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, had “offered him a deal: 
if he testified against Mr Khodorkovskiy and Mr Lebedev he 
would be released. Mr Karimov had allegedly told the applicant 
that the General Prosecutor‟s Office had been aware of his health 
situation, and that it would be advisable for the applicant to receive 
appropriate treatment, perhaps in a foreign hospital.”  Aleksanyan 
further alleged that, in April 2007 and November 2008, 
investigators had offered him release in return for his confession 
and cooperation in these cases.  Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. No. 
46468/06 (22 December 2008) at ¶ 86.
4
   
                                                 
4
 According to Aleksanyan‟s submissions to the European Court, at a hearing 
before the Russian Supreme Court on 22 January 2008, “which was widely 
covered in the Russian media, the applicant disclosed that the prosecution had 
made several offers of release on health grounds in exchange for false 
testimony, confirming that his lawyer had been present and had witnessed those 
incidents.  Immediately thereafter the Federal Penitentiary Service threatened 
the applicant‟s lawyer with a defamation suit, as the Government had moreover 
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On 22 December 2008, the European Court of Human Rights 
released its unanimous judgment of an application Aleksanyan 
filed concerning his detention and the search of his premises.  The 
Court held that there had been a violation of Article 3 due to 
inadequate medical care while in detention, a violation of Article 5 
§ 3 due to the unreasonable length of his detention, and a violation 
of Article 8 due to the vagueness of warrants issued for, and 
overbreadth of investigative searches conducted of, his premises.  
The Court further held that the Russian Government had failed to 
comply with interim measures that had been indicated by the Court 
under Article 39 and held that Aleksanyan should be released from 
detention.
5
  Following the Court‟s judgment, Aleksanyan was 
released on bail.  In June 2010, it was reported that the criminal 




The second trial of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev began on 31 
March 2009. 
A verdict was expected on 15 December 2010.
7
  Without 
explanation, the announcement of the verdict was postponed on 
that date until 27 December 2010. 
                                                 
5
 Although the European Court found that Russia had failed to comply with 
interim measures to protect Aleksanyan‟s health, in violation of Article 34 of the 
Convention, the Court concluded that Aleksanyan had not presented sufficient 
evidence to support his allegations about undue pressure “in connection with the 
proceedings in Strasbourg,” Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. No. 46468/06 (22 
December 2008) at ¶ 233, and held that Aleksanyan‟s complaint that his 
prosecution had been pursued for ulterior purposes (a violation of Article 18 of 
the Convention) was admissible but unnecessary to examine separately from the 
Court‟s findings of other violations.  Id. at ¶¶ 219-220. 
6
 Alexandra Odynova, Charges Dropped Against Yukos’ Aleksanyan, Moscow 
Times (25 June 2010). 
7
 See, e.g., Alexandra Odynova, Khodorkovsky Verdict is Postponed, Moscow 
Times (16 Dec. 2010); CNN Wire Staff, Verdict in Khodorkovsky’s 2nd Trial 
Postponed, CNN (15 Dec. 2010); RIA-Novosti, Announcement of Khodorkovsky 
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On 16 December 2010, during a nationwide television 
program, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin responded at length to a 
question about Khodorkovsky by saying, inter alia, that “a thief 
should sit in jail.”8 
On 27 December 2010, the verdict was read out.  
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were found guilty of embezzlement 
and money laundering and sentenced to fourteen years 
imprisonment.   
On 15 April 2011, the judicial collegium for criminal cases of 
the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation released its 
supervisory determination («определение суда надзорной 
инстанции») concerning various rulings about the defendants‟ 
detention made by the Khamovnichesky District Court and the 
Moscow City Court in 2010 and 2011.
9
  The Supreme Court 
concluded that the defendants‟ custody in a pre-trial detention 
facility (rather than in the less severe custodial conditions to which 
they were previously sentenced) from 17 August to 17 November 
2010 was unlawful. 
On 17 May 2011, the Moscow City Court was scheduled to 
hear the defendants‟ appeal from the verdict of the 
Khamovnicheskiy court.
10
  Without explanation, the hearing was 
postponed. 
                                                 
8
 See infra at Section(B)(2)(c) of Part V of this report. 
9
 See Opredelenie ot 15.04.11.  Sudebnaya kollegiya po ugolovnym delam, 
kassatsiya (Dokladchik: Shamov Aleksei Viktorovich) (№ 5-Д11-29).  This 
determination was the result of a new law, No. 60-FZ from 7 April 2010, which 
amended Article 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code to exclude those suspected 
or accused of certain crimes (including those of which the defendants were 
accused) from the harsher confinement conditions of pre-trial detention in the 
absence of certain exceptional circumstances. 
10
 Thomas Grove, Khodorkovsky appeal set for May 17: Russian court, Reuters 
(27 Apr. 2011); Tom Balmforth, Moscow Court Upholds Convictions Of 
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On 18 May 2011, President Dmitrii Medvedev responded to a 
question about Khodorkovsky at a press conference in Skolkovo, 
saying that there would be “no danger” to society if Khodorkovsky 
were to be released from prison.
11
 
On 24 May 2011, the defendants‟ appeal was heard and 
decided.  The Khamovnichesky court‟s verdict was upheld with a 
modest reduction in the original sentence. 
On 31 May 2011, the European Court of Human Rights 
released its judgment of an application Khodorkovsky filed 
concerning his arrest, detention, and first trial.  The Court found 
that Khodorkovsky‟s arrest violated Article 5 § 1 (b) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights; that the conditions of his 
detention in court and in a remand prison during his first trial 
violated Article 3 of the Convention; that the length of his 
continuous detention pending investigation and during that trial 
violated  Article 5 § 3 of the Convention; and that various 
procedural irregularities concerning his detention resulted in 
multiple violations of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.  The Court 
also found that Khodorkovsky‟s initial detention following his 
arrest did not violate Articles 3 or 5 § 4, nor had there been any 
violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention (which concerned 
whether his detention pending investigation and trial “had been 
imposed and extended in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law”).12 
                                                 
11
 Press Conference of the President of Russia, 18 May 2011, “Skolkovo” 
School of Management,  http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/11259. See infra at 
Section(B)(2)(c) of Part V of this report. 
12
 In addition, the Court also found that the procedure extending his detention on 
8 June 2004 did not violate Article 5 § 4 (distinguishing that instance with 
procedures that did violate that provision of the Convention on two prior 
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On 13 September 2011, the judicial collegium for criminal 
cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation released its 
supervisory determination («надзорное определение») 
concerning various rulings about the defendants‟ detention made 
by the Khamovnichesky District Court and the Moscow City Court 
in 2010 and 2011.
13
  The Supreme Court concluded that the 
defendants‟ custody in a pre-trial detention facility (rather than in 
the less severe custodial conditions to which they were previously 
sentenced) from 17 May to 17 August 2010 was unlawful. 
On 20 September 2011, the European Court of Human Rights 
released its judgment of an application filed by OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos concerning its treatment.  In a judgment that is 
not yet final, the Court held by majority votes that Yukos had not 
been afforded adequate time to prepare for hearings concerning 
certain tax assessments, in violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(b), and 
that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention had been 
violated both by the imposition of certain tax penalties and by the 
disproportionate nature of the enforcement proceedings.  The 
Court also found that there had been no violation of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 of the Convention concerning other tax assessments 
and no violation of Article 14 or Article 18 taken in conjunction 
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
14
  The Court reserved to a later 






                                                 
13
 See Opredelenie ot 13.09.11.  Sudebnaya kollegiya po ugolovnym delam, 
kassatsiya (Dokladchik: Kamenev Nikolai Dmitrievich) (№ 5-Д11-63).   
14
 The Court also held that examination of the case under Articles 7 and 13 of 
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V.  VIOLATIONS 
 
A.  ARTICLE 3 
 
1.  RELEVANT RUSSIAN LAW AND PRACTICE 
 




1.  The dignity of the individual shall be protected 
by the state.  Nothing may serve as a justification 
for its diminution. 
2.  No one shall be subjected to torture, violence or 
other cruel or degrading treatment or punishment.  
No one may be subjected to medical, scientific or 
other experiments without his free consent. 
 
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 
the Russian Federation are as follows: 
 
Article 9 
1.  In the course of criminal proceedings, any action 
or decision that demeans the honor of any 
participant in criminal proceedings is prohibited, as 
is any treatment of such person that lessens his 
worth as a human being or endangers his life or 
health. 
2.  No participant in criminal proceedings may be 
subjected to violence, torture, or any other treatment 
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2.  RELEVANT ECHR PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW 
 
Article 3 of the Convention states:  
 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
The European Court has frequently characterized treatment “to 
be both „inhuman‟ because it was premeditated, was applied for 
hours at a stretch and caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least 
intense physical and mental suffering, and also „degrading‟ 
because it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, 
anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them 
and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance.” Soering 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 (7 July 1989), at ¶ 100 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
The Court‟s case law concerning conditions of detention on 
remand in Russia is extensive and need not be repeated here.  It is 
worth noting, however, that Russian violations of Article 3 have 
been frequent and egregious.
15
  See, e.g., Kondratishko and others 
v. Russia, App. No. 3937/03 (19 July 2011).  In the year 2010 
                                                 
15
 The second judgment against Russia concerned, inter alia, conditions of 
detention.  Kalashnikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99 (15 July 2002).  Russia 
pled for a margin of appreciation due to economic difficulties alleged to hinder 
prison reform.  The Russian representative before the Court argued that 
Kalashnikov‟s conditions of confinement could not amount to torture, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment because they “did not differ from, or at least were no 
worse than those of most detainees in Russia.”  A Russian expert who appeared 
in Strasbourg on behalf of the Russian Government in that case later 
summarized this argument as a plea that “the conditions of confinement were 
Russian.”  See William Burnham & Jeffrey Kahn, Russia’s Criminal Procedure 
Code Five Years Out, 33 Review of Central & E. Eur. Law 24 (2008).  The 
Court routinely rejects such arguments.  See, e.g., Mamedova v. Russia, App. 
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alone, the Court found a violation of Article 3‟s right to be free of 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in 102 judgments, 
more than any other member state by a factor of three and 
amounting to half of all violations found against Russia that year.  
See Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, Annual 
Report 2010 150-151 (2011).   
 
a.  Conditions of Detention on Remand 
 
During the defendants‟ first trial, the defendants were held at a 
remand facility informally known as Matrosskaya Tishina.  
Lebedev was held in the main section, IZ-77/1, while 
Khodorkovsky was held in IZ-99/1, a special-purpose block.  For 
two days in October 2003, and then again after the trial but before 
departure to serve his sentence in a penal colony, Khodorkovsky 
was confined in IZ-77/1.   
The conditions at IZ-77/1, as well as the particular conditions 
of confinement in an isolation cell and the deprivation of 
opportunities for exercise and hot food due to his nearly daily 
attendance at trial (but available to other detainees) were the 
subject of Lebedev‟s second application to the European Court of 
Human Rights.  See Lebedev v. Russia (Lebedev No. 2), App. No. 
13772/05 (27 May 2010), at ¶¶ 195-201.  At the time of the writing 
of this report, a judgment on the merits of this application, declared 
admissible by a majority of the Court, had not occurred.   
The conditions at IZ-99/1 were the subject, inter alia, of 
Khodorkovsky‟s application to the European Court of Human 
Rights.  On 31 May 2011, the Court held that neither the  detention 
in October 2003 in IZ-77/1 (due to its brevity) nor detention in IZ-
99/1 during the trial (due to the ameliorative nature of food and 
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due to courtroom appearances, the use of fee-based extra services 
such as a fitness facility, and other benefits not accorded the 
general prison population) constituted a violation of Article 3.  
However, the Court did find that the detention in IZ-77/1 for two 
months after his conviction, when Khodorkovsky‟s treatment 
returned to that provided by the standard prison regime, violated 
Article 3.  Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (31 May 
2011), at ¶ 117-118. 
In making this assessment, the Court considered it appropriate 
to shift the burden of proof to the Russian Government regarding 
the conditions of Khodorkovsky‟s confinement.  Id. at ¶ 108.  This 
decision was based on the consistency of Khodorkovsky‟s 
submissions with those of a large number of petitioners to the 
Court regarding these same facilities, the large number of 
judgments against Russia in this regard, the practical difficulties 
inherent in a prisoner collecting evidence about the conditions of 
his detention, and the refusal of the authorities to allow 








                                                 
16
 The Court categorized the following judgments as presenting “very similar 
complaints” as Khodorkovsky, mostly concerning IZ-77/1: Andreyevskiy v. 
Russia, App. No. 1750/03 (29 Jan. 2009); Gubin v. Russia, App. No. 8217/04 
(17 June 2010); Starokadomskiy v. Russia, App. No. 42239/02 (31 July 2008); 
Popov v. Russia, App. No. 26853/04 (13 July 2006); Denisenko and 
Bogdanchikov v. Russia, App. No. 3811/02 (12 Feb. 2009); Sudarkov v. Russia, 
App. No. 3130/03 (10 July 2008); Belashev v. Russia, App. No. 28617/03 (4 
Dec. 2008); Trepashkin v. Russia (No. 2), App. No. 14248/05 (Dec.), (22 Jan. 
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b.  Conditions in the Courtroom 
 
Ordinarily, the measure of restraint adopted during trial for use 
in the courtroom has not been considered under the heading of 
Article 3 if it has been “imposed in connection with a lawful 
detention and does not entail a use of force, or public exposure, 
exceeding that which is reasonably considered necessary.”  
Ramishvili & Kokhreidze v. Georgia, App. No. 1704/06 (27 Jan. 
2009), at ¶ 96.  “Even in the absence of publicity, a given treatment 
may still be degrading if the victim could be humiliated in his or 
her own eyes.”  Id.  Risk of flight and threat of violence are 
countervailing factors that have been considered.  Id.   
During their first criminal trial, in the Meshchanskiy District 
Court from 16 July 2004 to 16 May 2005, the defendants were 
confined in a metal cage.  It is, perhaps, enough to note that the 
European Court found the conditions of Khodorkovsky‟s 
confinement in the courtroom during this first trial to violate 
Article 3 of the Convention.  Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 
5829/04 (31 May 2011), at ¶ 125-126.  The Court noted that the 
applicant‟s non-violent offense, lack of a criminal record, and lack 
of evidence of any predisposition to violence made the 
Government authorities‟ claim of security risks a specious one, 
especially given that the cage appeared to be a permanent court 
fixture unrelated to any specific concerns about the defendant.  The 
Court found that “such a harsh appearance of judicial proceedings 
could lead an average observer to believe that an extremely 
dangerous criminal was on trial.  Furthermore, the Court agrees 
with the applicant that such a form of public exposure humiliated 
him in his own eyes, if not in those of the public, and aroused in 
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This confinement was also a subject included in Lebedev‟s 
second application to the European Court of Human Rights.  See 
Lebedev v. Russia (Lebedev No. 2), App. No. 13772/05 (27 May 
2010), at ¶¶ 179-183.  As in Khodorkovsky‟s application to the 
Court, the precise conditions were disputed.  The Government 
authorities submitted that the cage was an appropriate restraint 
necessary to preserve courtroom order and safety and to prevent 
the intimidation of witnesses.  In any event, it did not rise to a level 
of severity sufficient to implicate the protections of Article 3 of the 
Convention.  Lebedev submitted that he was confined for up to 
nine hours a day without water or acceptable food, an unnecessary 
humiliation for a non-violent defendant that also interfered with his 
access to counsel.  The concerns of the court could easily have 
been alleviated by placing a guard next to him.   
At the time of the writing of this report, the European Court of 
Human Rights had not rendered a judgment on the merits of 
Lebedev‟s application.  On 27 May 2010, however, a majority of 
the European Court declared the allegation of a violation of Article 
3 admissible for a hearing on the merits.  Given that the European 
Court held that the same conditions in the courtroom described in 
Khodorkovsky‟s application constituted a violation of Article 3, it 
is likely that Lebedev‟s essentially identical application, 
concerning the same trial conditions, will also be held to present a 
violation of Article 3. 
 
3.  ANALYSIS 
 
a.  Conditions of Detention on Remand 
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Sufficient information about what improvements, if any, have 
been made to conditions of detention at Matrosskaya Tishina 
following the defendants‟ detention there during their first trial was 
not available for the drafting of this report.  Given the large 
number of judgments against Russia regarding violations of Article 
3 for conditions of detention – from the second judgment issued 
against Russia (Kalashnikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99 (15 July 
2002)) to its most recent judgment (Ilyadi v. Russia, App. No. 
6642/05 (5 May 2011) – another such judgment regarding the 
defendants‟ conditions of detention is entirely possible. 
 
b.  Conditions in the Courtroom 
 
During the second trial, press reports and photographs indicate 
that the defendants were confined inside a glass compartment.
17
  
Guards are seen in these photographs standing alongside the 
compartment.  On 3 March 2009, Khodorkovsky‟s attorneys filed a 
motion with the Khamovnichesky Court requesting that 
Khodorkovsky “be found alongside the lawyers, and not in an 
aquarium.”    According to the Khodorkovsky and Lebedev 
Communications Center, the motion was denied the same day.
18
   
It is difficult to say whether, under the factual circumstances of 
this case, the Court will consider the use of a glass compartment to 
be as degrading a form of treatment as the use of a metal cage.  On 
the one hand, a glass compartment may be considered to lack the 
stigma of a cage.  On the other hand, it remains a physical barrier 
                                                 
17
 As noted below, the use of glass compartments to detain defendants during 
trial has sometimes been analyzed by the European Court under the heading of 
Article 6 of the Convention, concerning the presumption of innocence. 
18
 Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Communications Center, Defense Files Two 
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between the defendant and all others.  The European Court will ask 
whether its use could have been “reasonably considered 
necessary.”   
Evaluation of the factors that the Court has considered in the 
past suggests that its answer will be negative.  The defendants were 
not accused of crimes of violence.  Although at the time of the trial 
they had criminal records, these were not for violent offenses.  
Given their incarcerated status and national media attention, they 
were unlikely risks of flight.  Indeed, Khodorkovsky had made 
considerable show of his refusal to leave Russia when other 
individuals suspected of the same crimes had fled.   
 
B.  ARTICLE 6 § 1  
 
1.  RIGHT TO PROCEEDINGS WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME 
 
a.  Relevant Russian Law and Practice 
 
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 





1. Criminal proceedings are carried out in a 
reasonable time. 
2.   Criminal proceedings are carried out in the time 
periods established by this Code. Extension of these 
                                                 
19
 This article was added to the Criminal Procedure Code by Federal Law of 30 
April 2010 (No. 69-FZ).  With regard to this amendment, as with all other 
amendments to the Code identified in this report, Article 4 of the Code provides 
that: “The law on criminal procedure in effect at the time of the performance of 
an appropriate procedural action or the making of a procedural decision shall 
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time periods is permitted in cases and in the manner 
foreseen by this Code, but criminal prosecution, 
imposition of a sentence and termination of a 
criminal prosecution should be carried out within a 
reasonable time. 
3. In determining a reasonable time period for 
criminal proceedings, which includes the period 
from the start of the criminal prosecution until the 
termination of the criminal prosecution or 
pronouncement of a judgment of conviction, such 
factors as the legal and factual complexity of the 
criminal case, the conduct of the participants of the 
criminal proceedings, the sufficiency and 
effectiveness of the actions of the court, the 
prosecutor, the head of the investigative body, 
investigator, head of the inquiry subdivision, the 
inquiry agency, inquiry officer, which are 
conducted to the ends of the timely accomplishment 
of the criminal proceedings or examination of a 
criminal case, as well as the total length of criminal 
proceedings are taken into account. 
4. The circumstances related to the organization of 
the work of inquiry agencies, the investigation 
agencies, the procurator‟s office and court, as well 
as the examination of the criminal case by different 
levels of authority may not be taken into account as 
a basis for exceeding the reasonable time period for 
the accomplishment of criminal proceedings. 
5.  If after submission of a criminal case to the 
court, the case is not tried for a long period of time 
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parties have the right to recourse to the court 
chairman with a motion on acceleration of the 
examination of the case. 
6. The motion on the acceleration of the 
examination of a criminal case is considered by the 
court chairman no later than 5 days from the day the 
motion was filed with the court. As a result of the 
examination of the motion, the court chairman 
issues a reasoned decision, in which a period for the 
conduct of a court‟s session on the case may be 
established and (or) other procedural actions to 




A motion shall be heard and disposed of as soon as 
possible after it is made.  When a motion made in 
the course of a preliminary investigation cannot be 
disposed of immediately, it shall be decided no later 
than three days after it was made. 
 
Article 129 § 2 
A time period may be extended only in situations 
and in accordance with the procedures specified in 
this Code. 
 
Article 144 §§ 1 & 3 
1.  An inquiry officer, inquiry agency, investigator, 
head of the investigating body must accept and 
investigate every report of the commission of a 
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make a decision on such report within the scope of 
his duties as defined by this Code no later than 3 
days after the filing of such a report. …  
3.  A head of the investigating body, head of an 
investigative unit or head of an inquiry agency, on 
the official, reasoned request of an investigator or 
inquiry officer, may extend the time period 
specified by part one of this Article up to 10 days.  
When the production of documentary verification, 
audits, research of documents, objects or bodies is 
necessary, the head of the investigative body at the 
request of the investigator or prosecutor at the 
request of the investigator may extend this period to 
30 days on concrete, factual circumstances giving 
rise to such extension with a binding instruction. 
 
Article 146 § 4
20
 
4.  The order initiating the criminal case shall be 
forwarded to a procurator without delay.  … Upon 
                                                 
20
 Paragraph 4 of this article was amended during the pendency of this case, see 
Federal Law from 2 December 2008 (No. 226-FZ), which shifted authority to 
initiate a criminal case from a prosecutor to the head of the relevant federal 
investigative committee, a newly created body.  The unamended version is 
provided above because the case was initiated in February 2007, prior to the 
coming into effect of this amendment.  The amended version, in relevant part, is 
as follows: “A copy of the order of the head of the investigating body, 
investigator, or inquiry officer initiating the criminal case shall be forwarded to 
a procurator without delay. … If a procurator recognizes an order initiating a 
criminal case as unlawful or unfounded, he has the right within 24 hours from 
the receipt of the materials serving as the basis for the criminal case to cancel 
the order initiating the criminal case, about which he gives a reasoned decision, 
a copy of which is provided without delay to the official who initiated the 
criminal case.  The head of the investigative body, the investigator, or the 
inquiry officer shall without delay notify the complainant and the person against 
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receiving the order, the procurator shall give his 
consent, without delay, to the initiation of a criminal 
case or issue an order withholding consent for the 
initiation of a criminal case or sending the materials 
back for an additional verification, which must be 
conducted within a period of no more than 5 days.  
The investigator or inquiry officer shall notify the 
complainant and the person against whom the 
criminal case was initiated of the procurator‟s 





1.  A preliminary investigation in a criminal case 
shall be completed within a time period not 
exceeding two months after the criminal case is 
initiated. 
2.  The preliminary investigation time period runs 
from the date the criminal case is initiated until the 
date it is forwarded to the procurator recommending 
an indictment, the date it is ordered to be forwarded 
to a court for consideration of whether to order 
involuntary medical treatment, or the date when an 
order dismissing proceedings in the criminal case is 
issued. 
                                                 
21
 Paragraph 7 of this article was amended once and paragraphs 4 and 5 were 
amended twice during the pendency of this case, see Federal Laws from 5 June 
2007 (No. 87-FZ) and 3 December 2007 (No. 323-FZ).  With regard to 
paragraph 4, the amendment reduces the permitted period of extension from six 
to three months and requires the assent of the corresponding head of the 
investigative body.  With regard to paragraphs 5 and 7, the amendment shifts 
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3.  The preliminary investigation time period shall 
not include any time during which the preliminary 
investigation was suspended on the grounds 
specified by this Code. 
4.  The procurator of a district, the procurator of a 
city, and equal-status military procurators and their 
deputies, may extend the preliminary investigation 
time limit up to 6 months. 
5.  In a criminal case in which the investigation is 
especially complex, the time limit on the 
preliminary investigation may be extended up to 
twelve months by the procurator of a subject of the 
Russian Federation, and equal-status military 
procurators and their deputies.  Any further 
extension of the preliminary investigation time limit 
may be made only in exceptional cases and may be 
effected solely by the Russian Federation Procurator 
General or his deputies. 
6.  When a procurator returns a criminal case for a 
supplementary investigation and also when a 
suspended or dismissed criminal case is reopened, 
the time period for such supplemental investigation, 
which shall be set by the procurator, may not 
exceed one month following the date such criminal 
case was filed with the investigator.  Any further 
extensions of the preliminary investigation time 
limit may be effected on the general grounds and in 
accordance with the general procedures established 
by this Article. 
7.  Whenever it becomes necessary to extend the 
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investigator shall issue an appropriate order to that 
effect and submit it to the procurator no later than 5 
days before the expiration of the preliminary 
investigation time limit. 
8.  The investigator shall notify in writing the 
accused and his defense counsel, as well as the 
victim and his representative, of the extension of the 
preliminary investigation time limit. 
 
Article 217 § 1 
After fulfilling the requirements of Article 216 of 
this Code the investigator shall present bound and 
numbered volumes of the criminal case file to the 
accused and to his defense counsel … 
 
Article 221 § 1
22
 
A procurator shall review the criminal case file with 
an indictment that was forwarded by the 
investigator and within 10 days shall make one of 
the following decisions: 
1)  approving the indictment and forwarding the 
criminal case to court. … 
 
Article 227 §§ 1 & 3 
1.  When a criminal case is filed in court, the judge 
shall make one of the following decisions: … 
3)  setting a trial date. … 
                                                 
22
 This article was amended during the pendency of this case, see Federal Law 
from 5 June 2007 (No. 87-FZ), which increased the time period above from 5 






29 CRIMINAL CASE N 1-23/10 
3.  The decision shall be made within 30 days after 
the criminal case is filed with the court.  … 
 
Article 233 § 1 
1.  Trial of a criminal case in court shall commence 
no later than 14 days after the order setting a trial 
date is issued … . 
 
Article 295 § 2 
2.  Before the court retires to the deliberation room, 
trial participants shall be informed of the time when 
the judgment is to be announced. 
  
b.  Relevant ECHR Provisions and Case Law 
 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:  
 
In the determination … of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time… . 
 
In judgments dating back decades, “the Convention institutions 
have consistently taken the view that Article 6 is, in criminal 
matters, „designed to avoid that a person charged should remain 
too long in a state of uncertainty about his fate‟[.]”  Nakhmanovich 
v. Russia, App. No. 55669/00 (2 March 2006) at ¶ 89 (citing 
Stögmüller v. Austria, App. No. 1602/62 (10 November 1969) at   
¶ 5).  The European Court has held that the “the duty to administer 
justice expeditiously [is] incumbent in the first place” on the 
member state.  Kudla v. Poland, App. No. 30210/96 (26 October 
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organise the investigation in such a way so as to comply with time-
limits, without prejudicing the rights of defence.”  Panchenko v. 
Russia, App. No. 45100/98 (8 February 2005) at ¶ 134.    
The word “charge” has autonomous substantive meaning 
within the context of the Convention.  Rokhlina v. Russia, App. 
No. 54071/00 (7 April 2005) at ¶ 81.  This is because “the 
prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair 
trial prompts the Court to prefer a „substantive‟, rather than a 
„formal‟, conception of the „charge‟ contemplated by Article 6 par. 
1 (art. 6-1). The Court is compelled to look behind the appearances 
and investigate the realities of the procedure in question.”  
Deweers v. Belgium, App. No. 6903/75 (27 February 1980) at ¶ 44 
(internal citations omitted).  The unchanging key to the European 
Court‟s jurisprudence in this regard appears to be linked to notice 
given the accused.  Thus, while arrest is conventionally accepted as 
one common indicia of the start of criminal proceedings for 
purposes of determining their length, see e.g. Moiseyev v. Russia, 
App. No. 62936/00 (6 Apr. 2009) at ¶ 190, the Court explained 
that the measure of the length of proceedings starts  
  
from an official notification given to an individual 
by the competent authority of an allegation that he 
has committed a criminal offence or some from 
[sic] other act which carries the implication of such 
an allegation and which likewise substantially 
affects the situation of the suspect.  According to 
the Court‟s constant case-law, a person has been 
found to be subject to a “charge”, inter alia, when a 
preliminary investigation has been opened in his 
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has officially learned of the investigation or has 
begun to be affected by it. 
 
Kangasluoma v. Finland, App. No. 48339/99 (20 January 2004) at 
¶ 26 (internal citation omitted).  Likewise, “the period to be taken 
into consideration in determining the length of criminal 
proceedings normally ends with the day on which a charge is 
finally determined or the proceedings are discontinued[.]”  
Nakhmanovich, supra, at ¶ 88. 
Whether the length of criminal proceedings is reasonable “must 
be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with 
reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the 
conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities [.]”  Sutyagin 
v. Russia, App. No. 30024/02 (3 May 2011) at ¶ 150.  In addition, 
a fourth factor – the importance of the proceedings for the accused 
– has also been adopted by the Court.  In particular, “where a 
person is kept in detention pending the determination of a criminal 
charge against him, the fact of his detention is a factor to be 
considered in assessing whether the requirement of a decision on 
the merits within a reasonable time has been met.”  Abdoella v. the 
Netherlands, App. No. 12728/87 (25 November 1992) at ¶ 24.   
Although “dilatory conduct” and behavior by the defendant 
intended to “otherwise upset the proper conduct of the trial” will 
be held against the applicant, Kudla, supra, at ¶ 130, delays 
attributable to the defendant asserting his rights will not be held 
against him.  Moiseyev, supra, at ¶ 192.  On the other hand, 
“substantial periods of inactivity, for which the Government have 
not submitted any satisfactory explanation, are attributable to the 
domestic authorities.”  Skorobogatova v. Russia, App. No. 
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c.  Analysis  
 
The determination of the length of proceedings – let alone the 
reasonableness of this period – is likely to be a point of contention 
between the parties.  The Government authorities may view 
February 2007, the date of the indictment, as the starting point, the 
first trial proceedings having concluded with the defendants‟ 
conviction in 2005.  The defendants may view July and October 
2003 (the dates of their initial arrests) or even shortly earlier (the 
point in time when they became aware that a criminal investigation 
had been opened) as the starting point.  The defendants may be 
inclined to argue that the 2007 indictment was artificially separated 
from the indictment leading to their first convictions, 
notwithstanding their common facts, parties, and legal issues.  
Indeed, these considerable common features between the two trials 
would seem to lend support to the defendants‟ view. 
The European Court‟s case law is unclear in this respect.  The 
Court has sometimes considered the finality of a criminal 
conviction to be a reliable marker.  Thus, in Löffler v. Austria, 
App. No. 30546/96 (3 October 2000) at ¶ 19, the applicant was 
convicted of murder but sought to reopen his criminal case on the 
basis of DNA evidence, which ultimately led to his acquittal.  In 
measuring the length of the criminal proceedings for purposes of 
evaluating his claim of a violation of Article 6, the European Court 
held that the relevant start was the reopening of the case, not the 
date when a criminal investigation was first initiated against the 
applicant.  The Court observed that the first proceedings had 
become final at the time of the applicant‟s conviction; he could 
have complained about their length at that time.  Id.   
On the other hand, a different conclusion was reached in 
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77722/01 (4 August 2005).  In that case, the applicants were 
charged with robbery and held in custody for eight months in 1993 
before being acquitted.  The prosecution successfully appealed.  
The case was reopened for investigation in 1994, then discontinued 
in 1997, reopened again in 1999 with the addition of a new charge 
(inciting witnesses to give false evidence), then discontinued in 
2005 as time-barred.  The Court measured the length of the 
proceedings from the original arrest in 1993 (rather than having 
begun with the reopening of the case in 1999) because the 
prosecutor‟s discontinuance of the inquiry “was not a final 
decision”  Id. at ¶ 21.  By this was meant the fact that “it was open 
to the prosecution to reopen the criminal investigation without 
having to seek leave from any domestic court that would have been 
obliged to consider the application according to certain criteria, 
including the fairness of reopening the case and whether an 
excessive period had passed since the decision discontinuing the 
investigation.”  Id. 
The present case fits more naturally within the analysis of the 
Stoianova case.  There, as here, the power in question is 
prosecutorial discretion, which rests in the hands of the 
Government authorities.  As in the Stoianova case, a complaint 
about the unreasonableness of the length of proceedings would be 
based on the decisions of prosecutors concerning the timing of 
their seriatim investigations and prosecutions for related acts.  The 
Löffler case is thus distinguishable in this respect.  In Löffler, the 
applicant himself sought to undo the finality of the proceedings 
and was stymied by delays attributable both to the prosecuting 
authorities and to the tribunal.  In the Stoianova case, on the other 
hand, the applicants sought repose from criminal proceedings 
repeatedly opened and closed by an irresolute prosecuting 
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not responsible for those shortcomings on the part of the 
authorities and should not therefore be put at a disadvantage as a 
result of them.” Stoianova, supra, at ¶ 21.  
The European Court and scholarly observers of its work have 
frequently linked the guarantees of Article 6 to the rule of law.  If 
the Government authorities are unable to adequately explain why 
the defendants were charged in serial fashion, rather than 
investigated and charged for all offenses concerning their actions 
as heads of Yukos, it would be difficult not to conclude that the 
relevant starting point to determine the reasonableness of the 
length of proceedings was the initial arrest of the defendants.  As 
noted, “substantial periods of inactivity, for which the Government 
have not submitted any satisfactory explanation, are attributable to 
the domestic authorities.”  Skorobogatova v. Russia, App. No. 
33914/02 (1 December 2005) at ¶ 49.   
The materials provided for use in this report are inadequate to 
reach a conclusion as to the credibility of an official explanation in 
this regard.  In this respect, however, it is worth noting that 
pursuant to Article 79(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, the defendants 
were eligible for conditional-early relief from their sentences after 
having served at least half of the term of their punishment.  The 
announcement of a new criminal case was made in February 2007, 
shortly before the defendants were eligible for parole.  Although 
beyond the scope of this analysis to confirm, it is also worth 
considering the conclusion of the rapporteur of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, who personally observed both 
the first and second trial of the defendants: 
 
Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev complained 
during their first trial of a parallel investigation 
taking place by the general prosecutor‟s office. 
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notified of all charges against them at the very latest 
at the start of the first trial in 2004 in accordance 
with Article 6 of the ECHR.  Some three years later, 
just as they were becoming eligible for parole, they 
were charged as a consequence of that parallel 
investigation. The parallel investigation concerning 
related allegations of impropriety should have been 
concluded, disclosure made and a decision reached 
as to whether further charges could or should be 
brought, before the start of the first trial. Mr 
Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev argue that it was an 
intolerable abuse of process that the prosecution 
should seek to conduct more than one investigation 
into essentially the same alleged misconduct. 
 
Document 11993, Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights (Rapporteur Mrs. Sabine Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger) (7 August 2009), at ¶ 101. 
If the proceedings are judged to have begun with the 
defendants‟ arrest in 2003, than they have lasted approximately 7½ 
years; if measured from the date of the second indictment, they 
have lasted roughly four years.  The case law of the European 
Court is highly variable in its assessment of such time periods, 
cases appearing on either side of the question of their 
reasonableness.  Thus, the Court has relied on case-by-case 
evaluations of different factors.  These factors are as follows. 
 
(1)  Complexity of the Case 
 
There is likely to be a dispute between the parties regarding 
this factor.  The authorities will likely note that the case file 
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financial scheme of oil embezzlement and money laundering 
involving multiple unindicted co-conspirators and numerous 
corporate entities and structures in different national jurisdictions.  
The defendants will likely assert that this complexity has been 
manufactured by the novel theory of embezzlement proposed by 
the prosecution in the first place.  It should be noted, however, that 
a finding of complexity – whether real or contrived – is not 
necessarily determinative.  The European Court found a violation 
of Article 6 in Yagci & Sargin v. Turkey, App. No. 
6/1994/453/533-534 (23 May 1995), notwithstanding the existence 
in that case of 40 volumes of files concerning 16 defendants 
represented by 400 lawyers over the course of 48 hearings.  Id., at 
¶¶ 11 & 60.   
As Professor Trechsel has observed from the evolution of the 
Court‟s case law, “[t]he only decisive element is, in fact, the way 
in which the authorities dealt with the case.  Whether the case is 
complex or not is in essence entirely irrelevant – a violation will 
only be found when there have been periods during the 
proceedings where no action was taken, although something could 
and should have been done.” Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in 
Criminal Proceedings 143 (2005). 
Thus, much depends on the determination of the starting point 
of the proceedings.  If the defendants‟ separate trials are judged to 
have been artificially bifurcated, the European Court‟s assessment 
of the state‟s delay in commencing the second prosecution may 
well be determinative. 
 
(2)  The Applicant’s Conduct 
 
The defendants maintained a vigorous defense, asserting their 
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throughout the course of the proceedings.  Any delays that may 
have resulted from these actions, however, cannot be tolled against 
the defendants.  Moiseyev, supra, at ¶ 192.  The Court has made 
very clear that defendants are not to be blamed for delays 
associated with the good-faith assertion of their rights, as Article 6 
“does not require a person charged with a criminal offence to co-
operate actively with the judicial authorities[.]”  Yagci & Sargin v. 
Turkey, App. No. 6/1994/453/533-534 (23 May 1995) at ¶ 66.   
  
(3)  Conduct of the Authorities 
 
As already noted, this factor is often the determinative issue in 
evaluating whether the length of the proceedings is unreasonable 
as understood in the Court‟s Article 6 case law.   
The failure to respect time limits established by the member 
state‟s domestic law is often taken by the Court as prima facie 
evidence that the length of the proceedings was unreasonable.  The 
materials provided for this report, and the time allotted to analyze 
them, were not sufficient to undertake a complete analysis of the 
compliance of the parties to the deadlines established by the RF 
Code of Criminal Procedure.   
Unexplained delays are often grounds for a finding of a 
violation of Article 6 under this heading.  As noted above, the 
investigation of the defendants appears to have been conducted in a 
staccato and serialized fashion.  The first criminal investigation 
preceded and immediately followed the arrest of the defendants in 
2003.  The preliminary investigation continued up to the 
defendants‟ trial, which commenced in June 2004 (but was 
immediately adjourned and resumed the next month) and 
concluded with the defendants‟ conviction in May 2005.  It is 
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years intervening between the defendants‟ first conviction in May 
2005 and the announcement of a new indictment in February 2007.  
The indictment was not finally submitted to the Khamovnichesky 
court until 14 February 2009; the trial began on 31 March 2009.  
The materials available for the completion of this report do not 
identify any stated reason for this delay of more than five years 
between the defendants‟ arrests and the start of their second 
criminal trial. 
While the defendants remained in detention since July and 
October 2003, their activities at Yukos were subject to extensive 
investigation.  Thus, the authorities‟ decision to prosecute the 
defendants in seriatim proceedings several years apart is hard to 
explain.  Furthermore, as noted below, both the Government 
authorities and the Khamovnichesky court in its verdict, frequently 
categorized the defendants as having engaged in illegal but 
uncharged activities, including fraud, bribery, deceit, and breach of 
trust.  By the time of the trial, however, these crimes (if they were 
committed) were effectively time-barred.  It is unclear whether the 
more straightforward crimes noted above were left uncharged 
because of lack of evidence (in which case their assertion without 
evidence in the verdict may be evidence of violations of other 
rights protected by the Convention) or because they were time-
barred as a result of the delay in issuing the indictment in this 
delayed fashion.  This outcome is reminiscient of Panchenko v. 
Russia, App. No. 45100/98 (8 February 2005) at ¶¶ 10-73, in 
which eight years passed between the initiation of a criminal case 
against the defendant (in custody for most of this time) and the 
dismissal of charges due to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations.  The European Court had no difficulty finding a 
violation of Article 6 in the Panchenko case, observing that it is 
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such a way so as to comply with time-limits, without prejudicing 
the rights of defence.”  Id. at ¶ 134. 
 
(4)  Importance of the Proceedings  
       for the Accused 
 
It cannot be gainsaid that the proceedings, on the outcome of 
which their liberty depended, were of the utmost importance to the 
accused.  At the time that the new charges were made, as noted 
above, the defendants were eligible for conditional-early relief 
from their sentences after having served at least half of the term of 
their punishment.  Aside from this fact, the defendants‟ sentences 
in the original case would have been satisfied in 2011, just as the 
new sentences for these new convictions began.  Thus the effect of 
seriatim prosecution was to leave the defendants in a “state of 
uncertainty about [their] fate.”  Nakhmanovich v. Russia, App. No. 
55669/00 (2 March 2006) at ¶ 89. 
  
2.  RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL 
 
a.  Relevant Russian Law and Practice 
 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation states, in relevant 
part: 
 
Article 118 § 1 
Justice in the Russian Federation shall be 
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Article 120 § 1 
Judges shall be independent and shall obey only the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal 
law. 
 
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 
the Russian Federation are as follows: 
 
Article 8 § 1 
Justice in a criminal case in the Russian Federation 
shall be administered solely by courts. 
 
Article 15 § 3 
3.  A court is not an organ of criminal prosecution 
and shall not take the prosecution or defense side in 
a case.  The court shall create the conditions 
necessary for the parties to perform their procedural 
duties and to exercise the rights granted to them. 
 
b.  Relevant ECHR Provisions and Case Law 
 
 Article 6 § 1 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:  
 
In the determination … of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
… by an independent and impartial tribunal …. 
 
It has long been established in the European Court‟s case law 
that the word “impartial” carries both a subjective and objective 
component.  Under the heading of subjective impartiality is 
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hold any personal prejudice or bias” against the accused.  Daktaras 
v. Lithuania, App. No. 42095/98 (10 October 2000) at ¶ 30.  There 
exists a rebuttable presumption of subjective impartiality. 
Under the heading of objective impartiality is understood the 
requirement that the tribunal “must offer sufficient guarantees to 
exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.”  Id. (internal citation 
omitted).  As to the objective component, “quite apart from the 
judge‟s personal conduct,” the issue is:  
 
whether, there are ascertainable facts which may 
raise doubts as to his impartiality. In this respect 
even appearances may be of a certain importance. 
What is at stake is the confidence which the courts 
in a democratic society must inspire in the public. 
Accordingly, any judge in respect of whom there is 
a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality 
must withdraw. This implies that in deciding 
whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason 
to fear that a particular judge lacks impartiality, the 
standpoint of the party concerned is important but 
not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear 
can be held to be objectively justified.  
 
Sigurdsson v. Iceland, App. No. 39731/98 (10 April 2003) at ¶ 37.  
In the Sigurdsson case, for example, the European Court 
considered whether a supreme court justice should have recused 
herself from a case involving a bank in which her husband was 
simultaneously involved in certain financial negotiations.  The 
Court unanimously found a violation of the right to an impartial 
tribunal notwithstanding its refusal to speculate “as to whether [the 
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no reason to believe that either she or her husband had any direct 
interest in the outcome in the case between the applicant and the 
National Bank.”  Sigurdsson, supra, at ¶ 45.  The standard of 
objective impartiality is therefore a high one: there must be 
“sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the 
absence of inappropriate pressure.”  Daktaras, supra, at ¶ 36.   
 
c.  Analysis 
 
As to the evaluation of the subjective impartiality of the 
Khamovnichesky court, the resources available to prepare this 
report were insufficient to determine the existence, or assess the 
merits, of allegations of bias held personally by Judge Danilkin 
against the defendants.  Likewise, the time allotted to complete this 
report was not adequate to examine all of the relevant sources by 
which to evaluate the objective component of the court‟s 
impartiality.
23
  There is sufficient information surrounding a few 
events close in time to the reading of the verdict, however, to call 
into question the existence of suitable safeguards to guarantee the 
objective component of the impartiality of the Khamovnichesky 
court.   
On 15 December 2010, a previously scheduled hearing to 
announce the verdict of the court was postponed until 27 
December 2010.  The Court provided no explanation for this delay.  
The following day, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, responding to a 
                                                 
23
 For example, a defense motion dated 20 September 2010 referenced 
accusations made by witness Pereverzin at the August 31, 2010 hearing that he 
was offered a suspended sentence if he would testify against Khodorkovsky.  
This motion makes other assertions of pressure concerning lawyer Aleksanyan, 
witness Valdes Garcia, and others.  It is simply not possible to evaluate these 







43 CRIMINAL CASE N 1-23/10 
question about Khodorkovsky during a nationally-televised 
program, said: 
 
As to Khodorkovsky, I have already spoken out 
many times on this account.  If you consider that I 
should say something else on this question, I may 
do so.  I, as well as the well-known character of 
Vladimir Vysotsky, consider that a thief should sit 
in jail.  And in conformity with the decision of the 
court, Khodorkovsky is charged with theft, a rather 
large theft.  It‟s about the non-payment of taxes and 
fraud, and the account there goes to billions of 
rubles.  True, there is also the non-payment of 
personal taxes, that is very important. 
But the charge against him now goes to 
hundreds of billions of rubles: 900 in one case, in a 
second case - 800 billion rubles, also theft. 
If we look at the practice in other countries, Mr. 
Madoff in the U.S.A. received for an analogous 
crime, yes and the money is roughly also the same, 
150 years imprisonment.  In my opinion, it looks 
like everything we have is much more liberal.  
Nevertheless, we should proceed from the fact that 
the crimes of Mr. Khodorkovsky have been proven 
in court. 
Yes, and in addition, you well know, I want to 
repeat once more, I am not speaking about him 
personally, I would like to remind that the head of 
the security service of Yukos sits in prison for 
murder.  They didn‟t like the mayor of 
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woman here in Moscow did not give them her small 
room, which they wanted to take – they murdered 
her.  A killer whom they hired, they murdered him.  
Only the brains were found in a garage.  Did the 
head of the security service himself, on his own 
initiative, carry out all of these crimes? 
So, there is a court, we have, as is well-known, 
one of the most humane in the world, this is its job.  




The Prime Minister‟s comments appeared to mix observations 
about both the first, completed trial, and the second, then 
unfinished one.  Nevertheless, commentators and media in Russia 
and elsewhere immediately interpreted his words as instructions to 
the court in the still uncompleted second trial.
25
  The Prime 
Minister first spoke about the first conviction, and then about the 
second one.  Then he said:  “Nevertheless, we should proceed from 
the fact that the crimes of Mr. Khodorkovsky have been proven in 
court.”  At this point it wasn't clear whether he was talking about 
the first conviction or the second one.  One might plausibly argue 
that the reference to crimes that “have been proven in court” 
unequivocally meant only the first conviction.  On the other hand, 
one can read the sentence as an expression of Putin's opinion: “the 
crimes of Mr. Khodorkovsky” – both cases having been referenced 
– “have been proven in the court.”  By simple clarification, the 
Prime Minister could have avoided this effect.   
                                                 
24
 Transcript of program “A Conversation with Vladimir Putin.  Continuation.”  
The program aired on television channels “Rossiya” and “Rossiya 24,” and radio 
stations “Mayak,” “Vesti FM,” and “Radio Rossiya.” 16 December 2010, 
available at: http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/13427/.  
25
 See, e.g., Catherine Belton, Putin Remarks Dash Hopes for Khodorkovsky, 
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That the Prime Minister was aware of the effect his words 
could have is suggested by his qualification of Khodorkovsky‟s 
connection to underworld figures and various murders: the Premier 
noted that he was not speaking about Khodorkovsky “personally.”  
This caveat, of course, would have been unnecessary had the Prime 
Minister not insinuated that Khodorkovsky, well-known as the 
head of Yukos and whose relationships to other Yukos executives 
was the basis for the charge that he was part of an “organized 
criminal group,” was in that way connected to murders that “they” 
committed.  Lest the point be lost, the Prime Minister asked, “Did 
the head of the security service himself, on his own initiative, carry 
out all of these crimes?”  The question, in context, clearly implied 
a negative answer.   
The Premier mixed into his remarks several references to 
popular culture.  The first reference, that “a thief should sit in jail,” 
is to the well-known 1979 Soviet mini-series, The Meeting Place 
Cannot be Changed (“Mesto vstrechi izmenit‟ nel‟zya”).26  The 
quotation is from the tough detective played by Vladimir Vysotsky 
and was clearly chosen because of its familiarity.  The continuation 
of that quote would be equally familiar to listeners: “… and people 
don‟t care how I put him away.”27  In the context of the Yukos 
case, these comments take on a sinister tone, especially given that 
the Premier had been President at the time of the defendants‟ arrest 
and first conviction.  The timing of these remarks, after the 
defendants‟ last word in the case sent the matter to the court‟s 
                                                 
26
 Ellen Barry, Putin Speaks his Mind, and Then Some, on Television, N.Y. 
Times (16 Dec. 2010). 
27
 The second reference, that the court is “one of the most humane in the world,” 
is a quote from a 1967 Soviet comedy film, The Prisoner of the Caucasus, or the 
New Adventures of Shurik (“Kavkazskaya plennitsa, ili Novye prikliucheniya 
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deliberation chamber but before the announcement of an 
inexplicably postponed verdict, was particularly chilling. 
Although they were far less disturbing in content, President 
Medvedev likewise made remarks about the Khodorkovsky case 
the day after the scheduled hearing on the defendants‟ appeal of 
their conviction was postponed, again without any explanation.  In 
response to a questioner at a press conference at the Moscow 
School of Management “Skolkovo,” the following exchange 
occurred: 
 
Y.Matsarskii: I represent radio station 
“Kommersant”-FM,” my name is Yuri Matsarskii. 
Dmitri Anatol‟evich, tell me, please, whether 
Khodorkovsky‟s release would be a danger for 
society? 
D. Medvedev: The question is short and the 





Although this statement would appear to cast the defendant in a 
favorable light, it remains an extrajudicial comment on a pending 
case.  Indeed, the surprise postponement of yet another scheduled 
hearing, followed by the widely disseminated comment of the 
President, naturally led to speculation about the signals sent by this 
protracted, public exchange about the defendants‟ fate between the 
head of state and the head of the government.
29
 
In light of these facts, it is easy to understand why the 
European Court has emphasized that “even appearances may be of 
                                                 
28
 Press Conference of the President of Russia, 18 May 2011, “Skolkovo” 
School of Management (http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/11259). 
29
 Interfax, Russian Activists Welcome President's Comments About 
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a certain importance” in setting a high standard for member states 
to ensure the objective impartiality of the courts with “sufficient 
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the absence of 
inappropriate pressure.”  Daktaras v. Lithuania, supra, at ¶¶ 32, 
36. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a 
democratic society must inspire in the public and above all in the 
parties to the proceedings.”  Id. at ¶ 32 (internal citation omitted).30  
  
                                                 
30
 Shortly after the defendants‟ conviction, several court officials alleged that 
government officials had interfered in the drafting of the Khamovnichesky 
Court‟s verdict.  Most prominently, Natal‟ya Vasil‟eva, the Court‟s press 
secretary, alleged that Judge Danilkin frequently received instructions with 
regard to his supervision of the trial, including his verdict, from superiors in the 
Moscow City Court.  See Roman Badanin & Svetlana Bocharova, Prigovor byl 
privezen iz Mosgorsuda, ya tochno znaiu, Gazeta.ru, 14 Feb. 2011.  Igor‟ 
Kravchenko, a co-worker at the Khamovnichesky Court, subsequently gave 
interviews in which he endorsed Vasil‟yeva‟s claims.  See Svetlana Bocharova, 
Interv’iu Vasil’evoi – Pravda, Gazeta.ru, 15 Apr. 2011.  On 20 June 2011, the 
Investigative Committee declined to open an investigation, rejecting the 
credibility of these witnesses and the authenticity of their evidence.  See 
Svetlana Bocharova, Danilkinu ne nashli sostava, Gazeta.ru, 20 June 2011.  It is 
unlikely that the European Court of Human Rights would disturb this finding 
absent an allegation of serious procedural irregularities in the Investigative 
Committee‟s decision-making process: Article 13 of the Convention protects the 
right to an effective remedy.   
 Another fruitful area of inquiry from the perspective of Article 6 § 1 
concerns the legal authority of the Chairwoman of the Moscow City Court over 
a particular judge.  A lack of “structural independence” could establish a 
violation of the Convention.  See, e.g., Whitfield and others v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 46387/99 (12 Apr. 2005) at ¶¶ 42-46.  The Parliamentary Assembly, at 
the behest of two of its committees, expressed its concern in this regard with 
particular attention to the informal practice of “telephone justice” and the power 
of court chairpersons.  See Resolution 1685 (2009), adopted by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 30 September 2009 (32nd 
sitting); see also Document 12038, Opinion of the Committee on Economic 
Affairs and Development (29 September 2009); and Document 11993, Report of 
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (7 August 2009). 
It is beyond the resources available for the writing of this report to 






 KAHN 48 
3.  RIGHT TO A REASONED JUDGMENT 
 
a.  Relevant Russian Law and Practice 
 
The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation are as follows:  
 
Article 47 § 1 
No one may be deprived of the right to have his 
case examined by the court and judge to whose 
jurisdiction it is assigned by law. 
 
Article 49 § 1 
Everyone accused of committing a crime shall be 
presumed innocent until his guilt has been proved in 
accordance with the procedure specified by federal 
law and established by final judgment of a court. 
 
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 
the Russian Federation are as follows: 
 
Article 7 § 4 
Rulings by a court and orders by a judge, 
procurator, investigator, or inquiry officer must be 
legally correct, well-founded, and well-reasoned. 
 
Article 297 
1.  The judgment of the court must be lawful, well-
founded and fair. 
2.  A judgment is deemed to be lawful, well-
founded and fair, if it is determined in compliance 
with the requirements of this Code and is based on 
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Article 299 
1.  When determining a judgment in the deliberation 
room, the court shall decide the following issues: 
1)  whether it has been proven that the act the 
defendant is charged with occurred; 
2)  whether it has been proven that the act was 
committed by the defendant; 
3)  whether the act constitutes a crime and by 
what Point, Paragraph and Article of the Criminal 
Code of the Russian Federation it is punishable; 
4)  whether the defendant is guilty of 
committing the crime; 
5)  whether the defendant should be punished 
for committing the crime; 
6) whether there are circumstances that mitigate 
or aggravate the punishment; 
7)  what sentence should be imposed on the 
defendant; 
8)  whether there are grounds for a judgment of 
guilty without sentence or for granting an 
exemption from punishment; *** 
 
Article 302 § 4 
A judgment of conviction may not rest upon 
speculation and such a judgment shall be rendered 
only if the guilt of the defendant in committing the 
crime is confirmed by the totality of the evidence 
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Article 303 § 1 
Upon deciding the issues referred to in Article 299 of 
this Code, the court shall proceed to write the 
judgment.  It shall be written in the language in which 
the trial was conducted and consist of an introductory 
part, a narrative-rationale part, and an operative part. 
 
Article 307 
The narrative-rationale part of a judgment of 
conviction must contain: 
1)  a description of the criminal act which the court 
determined was proven, with reference to the place, 
time and mode of its commission, the nature of the 
guilt involved in and the motives, objectives and 
consequences of the crime; 
2)  the evidence on which the court‟s findings 
regarding the defendant are based and the reasons the 
court rejected other evidence; 
3)  references to any circumstances mitigating or 
aggravating punishment, and reference to the grounds 
and reasons for modifying the charge if some part of 
the charge was found not to be well-founded or there 
was an erroneous classification of the crime; 
4)  the reasons for the court‟s decision on all the 
issues relevant to the sentence, any exemption from 
imposition of a sentence or from serving it, and for 
the application of other measures; 
5)  the grounds for any decisions made with 
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b.  Relevant ECHR Provisions and Case Law 
 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:  
 
In the determination … of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
… by an independent and impartial tribunal …. 
 
This provision has been interpreted to require that courts give 
reasons for their judgments.  See Van de Hurk v. The Netherlands, 
App. No. 16034/90 (19 Apr. 1994) at ¶ 61.  In particular, courts 
must “indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they 
based their decision.” Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, App. No. 
12945/87 (16 Dec. 1992) at ¶ 33.  The court is “under a duty to 
conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and 
evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its 
assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision[.]”  Kraska 
v. Switzerland, App. No. 13942/88 (19 Apr. 1993) at ¶ 30. 
On the other hand, the European Court has held that Article 6 
“cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every 
argument.”  Van de Hurk, supra, at ¶ 61.  “Nor is the European 
Court called upon to examine whether arguments are adequately 
met.”  Id.  It is not the task of the European Court, but for the 
national courts, to determine whether a submission by a party is 
well-founded.  Hiro Balani v. Spain, App. No. 18064/91 (9 Dec. 
1994) at ¶ 28; Ruiz Torija v. Spain, App. No. 18390/91 (9 Dec. 
1994) at ¶¶ 29-30.     
The determination of a violation of the right to a reasoned 
judgment can only be made on a case-by-case basis “in the light of 
the circumstances of the case.” Helle v. Finland, App. No. 
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extent to which the duty to give reasons applies may vary 
according to the nature of the decision at issue. It is moreover 
necessary to take into account, inter alia, the diversity of the 
submissions that a litigant may bring before the courts and the 
differences existing in the Contracting States with regard to 
statutory provisions, customary rules, legal opinion and the 
presentation and drafting of judgments.”  Id.  A margin of 
appreciation is accorded to national law and practice.  
Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, App. No. 12945/87 (16 Dec. 1992) at 
¶ 33.       
Professor Trechsel has elaborated on the importance of this 
requirement from the perspective of legal theory:  
 
The only possibility to verify a hypothesis in law 
lies in the reasons given.  They must be complete 
and logical.  Without reasons, a decision cannot 
claim to have legal character, let alone to be correct.  
Thus, without reasoning it would not be possible to 
distinguish a correct judgment from an arbitrary 
one.  In other words, a judgment which does not 
give reasons may not be, but certainly appears to be 
arbitrary. 
 
Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings 103-4 
(2005).  In addition, the requirement of reasoned judgments has 
numerous “instrumental and intrinsic virtues” for the pursuit of 
justice in a democratic society that have been widely recognized, 
including the value that inheres in the guarantee that a person is 
“being treated with dignity as a person, a sovereign agent, and not 
merely as an object who can be manipulated at the will of the 
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Convention on Human Rights Require Reasoned Verdicts in 
Criminal Trials?  11 Human Rights Law Review 213, 215 (2011).   
 
c.  Analysis of the Verdict 
 
At first glance, it may seem counterintuitive to suggest that a 
verdict of 689 pages may violate the right to a reasoned judgment 
guaranteed under Article 6 of the Convention.  The verdict‟s 
volume, however, should not be confused with its mass.  The 
verdict is indeed voluminous.  Its concentration of legal reasoning, 
however, is slight.  Under the European Court‟s standards, its 
failings violate the right to a reasoned judgment protected by 
Article 6.   
 
(1)  Pages 3-130 
 
The narrative-rationale part of the verdict, required by Article 
303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, begins on page 3 under the 
heading “Established” («Установил»).  The court appears to have 
complied with the Code‟s requirements in the most hyper-literal 
fashion.  On pages 3-130, the court presents its “description of the 
criminal act which the court determined was proven,” as required 
by Art. 307(1).  On pages 130-132, the court summarizes the 
defendants‟ separate arguments and testimony in their defense.  On 
pages 133-615, the court presents “the evidence on which the 
court‟s findings regarding the defendant[s] are based and the 
reasons the court rejected other evidence” as required by Art. 
307(2).   
With regard to pages 3-130 of the narrative-rationale part of the 
verdict, these cannot be understood to have “established” anything 
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and conclusions in this section might be described as a summary of 
the court‟s findings were this section not so long (especially as 
compared to the summary of the defendants‟ responses to these 
charges on pages 130-132,  which is less than 2% of this amount).  
There is no attribution of any particular assertion of fact to any 
piece of evidence in the record.  Nor is there any evaluation (or 
even acknowledgment of the existence) of conflicting evidence.  
Nor is there legal analysis that would apply evidence to law.  Thus, 
this section reads more like a prosecutor‟s indictment than a 
court‟s reasoned judgment.  Indeed, as noted below, that appears to 
be its provenance.  It cannot be described as a reasoned evaluation 
of the evidence.   
The artificial division of the court‟s conclusions from the 
evidentiary basis for them obscures instances where the court fails 
to provide any reason, in law or evidence, for its verdict.  Thus, on 
page 4, the court concludes: “The given contract was wrongful and 
contradicted the fundamental principles of civil law under Art. 1 of 
the RF Civil Code, since OAO NK Yukos as a legal entity was 
placed from the outset in such conditions under which it exercised 
its civil rights not by its own will, but by the will of a group of its 
core shareholders – which by this time had become M.B. 
Khodorkovsky, P.L. Lebedev and the members of the organised 
group acting jointly with them – and not in its own interests, but in 
the interests of the given organised group.”31  However, neither in 
this section nor later in the verdict are the “fundamental principles 
of civil law” identified or an explanation given as to how the 
contract was “wrongful” or “contradicted” them. 
Additional evidence of the lack of reasoning in this section of 
the verdict manifests itself in its drafting.  Multiple pages and 
paragraphs of text are duplicated, as if cut-and-pasted from one 
                                                 
31
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part of this section to another.  Thus, the seventy-six lines of text 
on pages 7 through 9 are identical to the text on pages 75 through 
77 with the exception of seven lines of text added to page 8 and a 
few other very minor differences.
32
  Likewise, the last two 
paragraphs on page 12 are, with the exception of the last ten words, 
identical to the last two paragraphs on page 13.  Twenty-two lines 
on pages 18 and 19 are virtually identical (save for one new 
sentence, one name, and assorted typographical errors) to lines 
found on pages 104 and 105.
33
  One hundred fourteen lines on 
pages 20 through 22 are virtually identical to lines found on pages 
105 through 107.
34
  The last two paragraphs on page 30, 
amounting to seventeen lines of text, are identical to the first two 
paragraph on page 31.  The 56 lines on pages 74 and 75 are 
virtually identical to lines found on pages 105 and 106.
35
   
                                                 
32
 The differences are that Khordokovsky‟s name appears twice and the names 
of two companies are added on pages 75-77, which references do not appear on 
pages 7-9.  In addition, one preposition («В» on page 7 becomes «Причем» on 
page 75) and one noun («сущности» on page 7 becomes «сути» on page 76) are 
changed and the phrase «иных/е лиц(а)» is added in three places on page 76.   
33
 The differences are that Lebedev‟s name appears on page 19 but is omitted 
from the same text on page 104; the word «указанным» on page 19 becomes 
«этим» on page 104. 
34
 The differences are that in the latter version, Khodorkovsky‟s name and the 
name of an additional company are added to text on page 105, the order of two 
paragraphs is inverted, the characterization «находящиеся в розыске» has been 
added to the paragraphs describing five individuals, the words «успешной 
преступной» on page 20 have been deleted from their corresponding place on 
page 105, the words «распоряжались» and «вопреки их интересам» on page 
21 have been deleted from their corresponding places on page 106, and the 
words «иное» and «указанного иное» on page 22 have been changed to 
«указанное» and «данного» on page 107.  There are also a number of minor 
typographical and punctuation errors found in these pages. 
35
 The differences are that the word «Через» on page 74 becomes «по» and the 
name of a company is added on page 105, and ten lines of text are inserted on 
page 106 along with the word «затем». A comma is also omitted on page 105 
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Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the verdict‟s composition 
in this regard is its extensive duplication of the indictment 
(«Обвинительное заключение по уголовному делу 
№18/432766-07»).  The indictment, of course, is composed by a 
criminal investigator pursuant to Article 220 and approved and 
forwarded to the court by the prosecutor pursuant to Article 
221(1)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, both of whom are 
participants in the criminal proceedings on the prosecution side, as 
indicated in Articles 37 and 38 of the Criminal Procedure Code.  
By law, the indictment must indicate, inter alia, “the nature of the 
charges, the place and the time of the commission of the crime, 
how it was committed, the motives, goals and consequences 
involved and other circumstances that are relevant to the criminal 
case; a statement of the charges brought, citing the Point, 
Paragraph and Article of the Criminal Code of the Russian 
Federation that specifies liability for the crime; a list of the 
evidence supporting the charges made; [and] a list of the evidence 
relied on by the defense”.36 
In this case, the indictment consists of fourteen-volumes 
containing 3460 pages.  Astonishingly, the first 130 pages of the 
verdict (and, quite possibly, much more) is a near exact copy of the 
indictment.  An annotated copy of those pages, indicating all 
differences and identifying the source of the material in the 
indictment, is attached to this report as an appendix.  The vast 
majority of differences between the two documents are not 
substantive differences.  Thus, the indictment frequently identifies 
by name individuals to whom the verdict refers in general terms as 
“members of the organized group” or “other persons.”  Similarly, 
the verdict tends to include the initials of Khodorkovsky‟s first 
name and patronymic (omitted from the indictment) and often adds 
                                                 
36
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Lebedev‟s name alongside that of Khodorkovsky.  Abbreviations 
may be spelled out, spaces added, or symbols changed into words 
(as, for example, “%” to “per cent”).  Occasionally, the name of a 
company listed alongside many others in the indictment is omitted 
from the verdict, although this is rare.  Otherwise, the texts are 
identical.  This perhaps explains the odd duplications identified in 
the text accompanying footnotes 22 through 25 of this report: they 
were simply carried over from the same duplication in the 
indictment. 
Such brazen copying is compelling circumstantial evidence 
that the court has not engaged in its own process of reasoned 
decisionmaking to reach its judgment.  It is also persuasive support 
for a finding that the court has violated other rights held by the 
accused under the European Convention, including the right to an 
independent and impartial tribunal and the right to equality of 
arms. 
(2)  Pages 133-615 
 
Even if this cutting-and-pasting between indictment and verdict  
were to be disregarded as insufficient proof, eo ipso, that the court 
failed to engage in reasoned decisionmaking, the manner in which 
the remainder of the verdict relates the evidence to the charges 
draws the court‟s reasoning process into serious question.  In short, 
the court frequently identifies evidence but rarely reasons from it 
to a legal conclusion.  In this way, the verdict mimics what was 
observed at trial by a rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe: 
 
The trial itself, so far, consists in reading out, 
apparently at random, short passages of corporate 
and other documents without any discussion of their 






 KAHN 58 
accusation.  The demand of Mr. Lebedev “that the 
prosecutors explain which evidence corresponded to 
which episode and charge” seems reasonable to me, 
as does the insistence of the defence lawyers that 
“the documents should be not only read out but also 
examined.”  To me, this should go without saying in 
any trial. 
 
Document 11993, Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights (Rapporteur Mrs. Sabine Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger) (7 August 2009) at ¶ 99. 
The verdict makes its first citation to any piece of evidence in 
the record on page 133.  From that page to page 615, the court 
provides lists of evidence from identified portions of the record.  
Each list is headed by a paragraph (sometimes) set in boldface 
type.  The boldface paragraph is written in a standard form that 
states a conclusion and then provides a list of evidence (with 
citation to the case file or trial record) as support for that 
conclusion.  This section appears to be organized to conform with 
the literal requirement of Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure 
Code to “contain … the evidence on which the court‟s findings 
regarding the defendant are based … .” 
However, the listing of documents under a conclusory heading 
is not equivalent to reasoning from this evidence to conclude that 
the elements of the charged offenses have been proven.  For 
example, the court‟s first boldface heading appears at page 140:  
 
The court links building of a vertically-integrated 
structure of management of OAO NK Yukos with 
the [criminal] intent of the defendants aimed at 
creating conditions for oil theft. Creation with the 
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Lebedev of the executive bodies for the oil 
producing companies represented by ZAO Yukos 
EP turned out to be one of such conditions.   
 
The verdict then states that “This circumstance is corroborated 
by:” and follows this phrase with a list of nine pieces of evidence 
from the case file, including five sets of minutes of shareholders 
meetings, three contracts, and a corporate order, all of which are 
described as concerning the transfer of powers between different 
companies.  No part of any document is quoted to support its 
conclusory description by the court.  No analysis of this evidence 
is provided nor an explanation offered to support the conclusion 
asserted in the boldface heading.  Nor is the concept of establishing 
a “link” between the Yukos corporate structure and the defendants‟ 
criminal intent explicated in terms of Russian law. 
As another example, the boldface heading on page 143 states: 
 
 The guilt of the defendants in building of the 
vertically-integrated structure of management as a 
mechanism of management of the process of theft 
and realization of the stolen oil by means of 
establishing ZAO Yukos RM and transfer to it of 
the required powers is corroborated by:   
 
Twenty-four items of evidence are then listed with brief summaries 
of their contents: the testimony of two witnesses, eight sets or 
extracts of corporate minutes, a corporate charter, seven contracts, 
three corporate orders, a power of attorney, an extract from a share 
registry, and an “information statement.”  No analysis is 
conducted.  Nor is any interpretation of these materials – on their 
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court concluded from them that they indicate any form of “guilt” 
or intent to organize these entities for the “management of the 
process of theft and realization of the stolen oil.”  Indeed, 
Khodorkovsky is mentioned in only two of these documents, in 
both cases extracts of minutes from general shareholders meetings 
at which he appeared as chairman of the board of ZAO Yukos RM. 
Sometimes the court asserts to have established facts and legal 
positions that in fact have not been established.  On page 147, the 
court asserts that “[i]t has been established” that the corporate 
structure it has described in the preceding pages “was an abuse of 
right.”  But no such legal analysis was attempted in the preceding 
section of the verdict, nor was the particular right the court states 
to have been abused even identified in Russian law.  The court 
continues that these structures “entailed violation of equality of its 
participants since, as legal entities, the oil producing companies 
were intentionally put at a disadvantage when they were unable to 
exercise their rights at their own will and to achieve the major goal 
of their activity – generating profit.”  But no evidence appears in 
the preceding section concerning any profit at all.  Finally, the 
court continues that “The management of the oil producing 
enterprises was performed exclusively in the interests of the group 
of the main shareholders which, by that time, already included 
M.B. Khodorkovsky and P.L. Lebedev, as well as other members 
of the organized group acting together with them.”  On the 
contrary, no evidence concerning the “interests” of anyone is 
presented.  The minutes, charters, and other corporate documents 
merely describe the basic organizational structures of these 
companies, and their relationships with other companies. 
Another example of a conclusory heading unsubstantiated by 
the evidence listed in support of it is found on pages 155-157.  In 
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established the defendants‟ “purpose of facilitating and 
concealment of the commitment of the theft of oil from the oil 
producing companies[.]”  The documents that follow are the 1996 
charters for Yuganskneftegas, Samaraneftegas and Tomskneft 
VNK, contracts establishing terms for the future conclusion of oil 
purchase and sale contracts, an amendment to one of those 
contracts, and an undated document that the court asserts was 
approved by Khodorkovsky and that states “… responsibility of 
officers and Board members to shareholders for decisions that 
should have definitely lead to losses for the entity (trading 
transactions are unequivocally such since they formally lead to 
understatement of the plant‟s profit) provided for by the law is also 
a factor that would be desirable to be avoided.”  Other than the 
bare description of these items, nothing more is said.  There is no 
legal analysis applying the relevant Russian law to these 
documents or explaining how they demonstrate the intent of 
anyone to steal oil, which on their face they do not.   
This technique continues through page 615 of the verdict.  A 
heading (usually in boldface type) asserts the establishment of 
some fact or legal conclusion.  Documents from the case file or 
testimony from the trial record are then listed.  But the conclusion 
or fact is not apparent on the face of the listed evidence and no 
attempt is made by the court to explain how it reached such a 
conclusion. 
In other parts of the verdict, the court reaches conclusions 
about the defendants‟ intent that are not only unsupported by the 
evidence it references, but contradicted by it.  On page 157, the 
verdict presents one of its boldface conclusions: 
  
The guilt of the defendants in the arrangement of 
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concluding of the economically unfounded general 
agreements is also corroborated by the pieces of 
evidence examined by the court in the course of the 
trial: 
 
There then follows one piece of evidence entitled “Draft 
decisions of the Board of Directors of OAO Tomskneft VNK of 22 
January 1999, including the following records”.  On the basis of 
this document, the verdict states: 
 
The court presumes that this document corroborates 
the intent of the defendants to embezzle the oil 
produced at the price of RUB 250 per tonne, while 
they were aware of the fact that its market price was 
RUB 1,665.61 [per tonne] which also corroborates 
their intent to embezzle someone else‟s property by 
means of clearly nonequivalent payment of its 
value.   
 
On the contrary, the document as described in the verdict does 
nothing more than indicate that two different markets were in 
operation, a domestic market and a foreign market for oil.  The 
document indicates the relative values at which the oil traded in 
both markets.  But the verdict, while identifying two prices, refers 
to only one market.  By eliding this fact of two separate markets, 
the court creates the false impression that only one market was in 
operation with only one price set for the sale of oil.   
The very next piece of evidence cited in the verdict, at page 
159-160, in fact confirms the very opposite of this assertion.  The 
court cites the minutes of a shareholders meeting for OAO 
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referenced in the previous document are approved.  This 
document, as described in the verdict, makes clear that sales will 
occur at the different prices determined by the relevant markets:  
 
As a result of the voting, the majority made the 
following decision: since the production and the 
sale of oil produced has for a long time been regular 
business activities of OAO Tomskneft VNK, to 
declare the production and the sale of oil to be the 
core activities of OAO Tomskneft VNK in future as 
well, and, to this end, to conduct transactions on 
purchase and sale of the oil and/or oil-well fluid on 
behalf of OAO Tomskneft VNK in compliance with 
the following set conditions: sale of the oil 
produced by OAO Tomskneft VNK, to the 
following companies: OAO NK Yukos, OAO VNK, 
Total International Limited, Behles Petroleum S.A., 
ROSCO S.A. in the amount of 50 million tonnes 
over the period of 3 years at the current market 
price of RUB 250.08 per tonne in the domestic 
market and RUB 1,665.61 per tonne in the foreign 
market of the RF; 
 
Although the verdict states that this document corroborates its 
statement that the defendants intended to embezzle oil by using a 
lower price than “its market price,” the evidence that the court cites 
in fact reveals two markets, not one, and for sales to both domestic 
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(3)  Responsiveness of the Verdict 
       to Defense Arguments 
 
The above analysis of the verdict‟s composition and substance 
suggests a lack of reasoning that would violate Article 6.  
However, the European Court typically gives a margin of 
appreciation to the practices of member states.  Unless the critiques 
made of this verdict were particularly unusual or egregious 
compared to other Russian verdicts – an analysis in which the 
European Court may decline to engage – an application to the 
Court alleging a violation of Article 6 on these grounds may meet 
with a cool reception.  On the other hand, the Court may find a 
violation that would require systemic change in judicial practice.  
Predicting either course is very difficult.   
More commonly, individual applications complaining of a 
violation of this section of the Convention allege failures of the 
court to respond to particular evidence or arguments by a party, 
rather than to a critique of the quality of the reasoning process 
within the judgment itself.  In this regard, the record may well 
reveal lacunae where responses to motions and arguments by the 
defendants should appear.   
Regretfully, this report cannot engage in that analysis with any 
certainty.  It has not been possible to verify whether the record of 
materials to which the author of this report was directed, 
www.khodorkovsky.ru, contains a complete collection of defense 
motions and judicial responses to them.  Thus, in a summarizing 
statement delivered toward the end of the defendants‟ presentation 
of their case, defense attorney Elena Liptser and others stated that 
“in the course of the pre-trial proceedings there were numerous 
occasions when the investigators refused to admit exculpatory 
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for the case, falsified circumstances and arguments set out to 
substantiate procedural decisions, and ignored provisions of 
law.”37  Although some of the issues to which Liptser alluded 
concerning the admission of exculpatory evidence will be 
discussed under the heading of Article 6 § 3, infra, it has simply 
not been possible to isolate and examine discrete instances of the 
actions she describes.  Nor has there been a sufficient opportunity 
to peruse with care the transcript of the trial proceedings.  The 
issue can only be flagged for the potential violation that may sit 
within it.     
 
C.  ARTICLE 6 § 2 – THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
 
1.  RELEVANT RUSSIAN LAW AND PRACTICE 
 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation states, in relevant 
part: 
Article 49 
1.  Everyone accused of committing a crime shall be 
presumed innocent until his guilt has been proved in 
accordance with the procedure specified by federal 
law and established by final judgment of a court. 
2.  The defendant shall not be obliged to prove his 
innocence. 
3.  Any remaining doubts about guilt shall be 
resolved in favor of the defendant. 
 
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 
the Russian Federation are as follows: 
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Article 14  
1.  An accused is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty of a crime in accordance with the procedures 
specified in this Code and determined by a final 
court judgment. 
2.  A suspect or accused is not required to prove his 
innocence.  The burden of proof of the charges and 
negation of defense arguments rests on the 
prosecution. 
3.  All doubts as to the guilt of an accused that 
cannot be dispelled by means of the procedures 
established by this Code shall be resolved in favor 
of the accused. 




1.  The evidence in a criminal case is any 
information that provides a basis for a court, 
procurator, investigator, or inquiry officer to 
determine, in accordance with the procedures 
established by this Code, whether circumstances 
that are subject to proof in proceedings in a criminal 
case, or other circumstances relevant to the case, 
exist. 
2.  The following are admissible as evidence:  
1)  testimony given by a suspect or accused; 
2)  testimony given by a victim or witness; 
3)  report and testimony of an expert; 
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4)  physical evidence; 
5)  official records of investigative and  
      judicial actions; 
6)  other documents. 
 
Article 79 
1.  Witness testimony consists of information 
communicated by a witness during questioning 
conducted in the course of pre-trial proceedings or 
in court in accordance with the requirements of 
Articles 187-191 and 278 of this Code. 
2.  A witness may be questioned about any 
circumstances relevant to the criminal case, 
including the character of the accused or the victim, 




Verification of evidence shall be undertaken by an 
inquiry officer, investigator, procurator, or court by 
means of comparing it to other evidence available in 
the criminal case file and also by identifying its 
source and obtaining other evidence that 
corroborates or contradicts the evidence being 
reviewed. 
 
Article 217 § 1 
After fulfilling the requirements of Article 216 of this 
Code the investigator shall present bound and 
numbered volumes of the criminal case file to the 
accused and to his defense counsel, except in the 
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2.  RELEVANT ECHR PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW 
 
Article 6 § 2 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:  
 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to 
law. 
 
Professor Trechsel has distinguished the “outcome-related 
aspect” of the presumption of innocence from its “reputation-
related” aspect.  The former regards  
 
the psychological climate in which proceedings 
ought to unfold and it requires that the prosecutor 
and the judge adopt a particular attitude.  Even 
though, deep down in their hearts, they may be 
convinced of the accused‟s guilt, they must remain 
open to a change of opinion in view of the result of 
the evidence.  They are prohibited from doing or 
saying anything, before the judgment has been 
delivered, which implies that the defendant has 
already been convicted. 
 
Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings 163 
(2005).  The latter regards the treatment of the accused by state 
officials other than the prosecutor and judge.  The accused “who 
has not been convicted in criminal proceedings must not be treated 
or referred to by persons acting for the state as guilty of an 
offence.”  Id. at 164.   
As the European Court has frequently stated, the presumption 
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concerning a person charged with a criminal offence reflects an 
opinion that he is guilty before he has been proved so according to 
law. It suffices, even in the absence of any formal finding, that 
there is some reasoning to suggest that the official regards the 
accused as guilty.  In this regard the Court emphasises the 
importance of the choice of words by public officials in their 
statements before a person has been tried and found guilty of an 
offence. ”  Daktaras v. Lithuania, App. No. 42095/98 (10 October 
2000), at ¶ 41 (internal citation omitted).   
It should be noted that “the presumption of innocence may be 
infringed not only by a judge or court but also by other public 
authorities.”  Allenet de Ribemont v. France, App. No. (15175/89), 
at ¶ 36.  In that foundational case, the European Court found that 
remarks by high-ranking officials at a press conference two weeks 
prior to the formal charging of the accused violated his right to be 
presumed innocent: “some of the highest-ranking officers in the 
French police referred to [the applicant], without any qualification 
or reservation, as one of the instigators of a murder and thus an 
accomplice in that murder … . This was clearly a declaration of the 
applicant‟s guilt which, firstly, encouraged the public to believe 
him guilty and, secondly, prejudged the assessment of the facts by 
the competent judicial authority.”  Id. at ¶ 41.  
Conditions of detention during judicial proceedings have also 
been considered under the heading of the principle of the 
presumption of innocence.  This may represent a transition in the 
Court‟s interpretation of the Convention, as the case law is mixed.  
In a Commission Report that does not reveal the factual 
circumstances of the application beyond the complaint that the 
applicant had been held in a “glass cage” during his trial, a 
majority of the Commission found no violation of Article 6 § 2.  
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recently, the Court held that the use of a metal cage in an appellate 
courtroom did not violate the applicant‟s presumption of innocence 
(although it did work a violation of Article 3) because it was “a 
permanent security measure used for all criminal cases” and 
therefore “the imposition of this measure does not suggest that the 
Court of Appeal regarded the applicant as guilty.”  Harutyunyan v. 
Armenia, App. No. 34334/04 (15 June 2010), at ¶ 138.  The Court 
did not address concerns it has expressed about what Judge 
Trechsel has termed the “reputation-related” aspect of the 
presumption of innocence. 
However, in another case concerning a metal cage, the Court 
expressed concern that “a harsh and hostile appearance of judicial 
proceedings could lead an average observer to believe that 
extremely dangerous criminals were on trial” when in fact the 
defendants could not be so characterized.  Ramishvili & 
Kokhreidze v. Georgia, App. No. 1704/06 (27 January 2009), at ¶ 
100.  The Court observed that this could be seen as “undermining 
the principle of the presumption of innocence.”  Id.  In this context, 
the Court has noted that “[s]uch harsh treatment could easily have 
had an impact on the applicants‟ powers of concentration and 
mental alertness during the proceedings bearing on such an 
important issue as their physical liberty, thus calling for very close 
scrutiny by the Court.”  Id.     
 
3.  ANALYSIS 
 
Many different bases may be suggested for a violation of the 
presumption of innocence, but three are identified with 
particularity here.  One basis for a violation may be the detention 
of the defendants in the courtroom in a glass and metal cage 
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concerning the guilt of the defendants prior to the deliberation on 
their guilt by the court.  These officials may be associated with the 
trial (e.g. statements by prosecutors at press conferences) or not 
(e.g. high government officials).  A third basis for a violation of 
the presumption of innocence is worked by a strange feature of 
Russian criminal procedure that results from its contradictory 
merging of inquisitorial and adversarial principles of justice.   
 
(a)  Conditions of Detention in the Courtroom 
 
The national and international media frequently reported that 
the defendants were detained in glass and metal containers during 
all courtroom proceedings.  The defense filed an (unsuccessful) 
motion to allow Khodorkovsky to sit with his lawyers, rather than 
in the “aquarium.”  This container was also guarded by several 
police.  It has been reported that these police were armed, but the 
author of this report lacks any official records by which to 
corroborate these journalistic descriptions.  Based on the finding of 
a violation of Article 3 in regard to Khodorkovsky‟s detention in 
the courtroom during his first trial, however, such reports seem 
prima facie credible. 
As noted above, the case law of the European Court is mixed 
on this question and may be in a state of transition.  In at least one 
case, the Court has declined to find a violation of Article 6 § 2 
even when it has found a violation of Article 3 under the same 
facts.  Harutyunyan v. Armenia, App. No. 34334/04 (15 June 
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(b)  Extra-judicial statements of guilt 
 
In this regard, the analysis, supra, of the Prime Minister‟s 
remarks during a nationally broadcast television program 
immediately following the unexplained cancellation of the hearing 
at which the verdict was expected to be announced, is also relevant 
to the issue of their perceived impact on the court‟s independence 
and impartiality. 
As noted above, the European Court has been categorical in 
finding that the presumption of innocence “will be violated if a 
statement of a public official concerning a person charged with a 
criminal offence reflects an opinion that he is guilty before he has 
been proved so according to law.”  Butkevicius v. Lithuania, App. 
No. 48297/99 (26 March 2002), at ¶ 49.  The facts of that case are 
instructive.  The Lithuanian Minister of Defense was caught in 
flagrante delicto receiving an envelope full of money alleged to be 
a bribe.  A few days after his arrest, the national press quoted the 
Prosecutor General as saying that he had “sound evidence of the 
guilt” of the minister and the Chairman of the Seimas called the 
minister a “bribetaker,” saying he “entertain[ed] no doubt” that the 
minister took a bribe.  The parliament stripped the minister of his 
parliamentary immunity and he was subsequently charged with 
obtaining property by deception, a crime different than accepting a 
bribe. 
The European Court was unpersuaded by the Government 
authorities‟ argument to consider the evidentiary context (the 
minister was caught red-handed), the purpose of the impugned 
statements (explaining the need to deny parliamentary immunity), 
and the fact that the officials‟ statements concerned a crime with 
which the minister had not been charged.  The Court noted that the 
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declarations by a public official of the applicant‟s guilt, which 
served to encourage the public to believe him guilty and prejudged 
the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authority.”  
Id. at ¶ 53. 
In the present case, the circumstances are even more extreme.  
On the very day announced for the rendering of its verdict, the 
court postponed the proceedings with a perfunctory note on the 
door of the court.  No reason was provided.  The Prime Minister‟s 
strong words, implying not just guilt of theft but also implicating 
the defendants in uncharged violent crimes, carried exceptional 
force.  This is especially the case given the controlled environment 
– a nationally broadcast call-in program – in which the Prime 
Minister elected to make them.  It is because of the power of such 
statements, magnified by national news media, that the Court has 
emphasized “the importance of the choice of words by public 
officials in their statements before a person has been tried and 
found guilty of an offence.”  Daktaras v. Lithuania, App. No. 
42095/98 (10 October 2000), at ¶ 41 (internal citation omitted). 
 
(c)  Evidentiary Presumptions favoring  




Legal presumptions affect several aspects of the right to a fair 
trial, implicating as they do the guarantee of an impartial tribunal 
and their effect on the fundamental presumption of innocence.  
Article 6 § 2 “does not therefore regard presumptions of fact or of 
law provided for in the criminal law with indifference. It requires 
                                                 
38
 This section draws on Jeffrey Kahn, Adversarial Principles and the Case File 
in Russian Criminal Procedure, in Russia and the Council of Europe: Ten Years 
After (Katlijn Malfliet & Stephen Parmentier, eds. 2010), and William Burnham 
and Jeffrey Kahn, Russia’s Criminal Procedure Code Five Years Out, 33 
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States to confine them within reasonable limits which take into 
account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights 
of the defence.”  Salabiaku v. France, App. No. 10519/83 (7 
October 1988), at ¶ 28.   
Although Russian law has embraced the concept of adversarial 
proceedings, and purports to place the defence on an equal footing 
with the prosecution, the law retains certain provisions from its 
past, decidedly non-adversarial approach to criminal justice.  This 
hybrid of inquisitorial and adversarial principles results in legal 
presumptions in favor of the evidence collected by the state.  This 
is a violation both of the equality of arms protected by Article 6 § 3 
(discussed below) and the presumption of innocence.   
The Russian Code of Criminal Procedure departs from the 
previous (Soviet) criminal procedure codes by identifying the 
investigator as a participant on the prosecution side and by 
granting the defense the right to gather and present evidence.  In 
other words, the Code departs from the civil-law tradition that the 
investigator is a neutral state official who conducts a “complete 
and objective investigation,” a phrase used in the previous code of 
criminal procedure that was almost completely eliminated from the 
current one.
39
   This would seem to be in keeping with adversarial 
principles, established in the Code, that provide for the right of the 
defense “to gather and present evidence as is necessary to provide 
legal representation.”  Such a right would appear to establish the 
requisite equality of arms with the prosecution side.  
However, although Russian criminal procedure foresees the 
possibility of dual pre-trial investigations by partisan parties to the 
case in search of evidence, it still primarily relies on the case file.  
                                                 
39
  Article 152(4) of the Code, for example, a venue provision, states that: “The 
preliminary investigation may be conducted where the accused or the majority 
of witnesses are located, in order to secure its completeness, objectivity and 
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And although that case file has ostensibly been stripped of the 
imprimatur of officialdom, it remains the dynamo that drives non-
jury criminal cases.  Indeed, under Article 217 of the Code, the 
case file is not to be presented to the accused and to his defense 
counsel until its volumes have been “bound and numbered.”  
Although this would seem to be a reasonable precaution against 
post hoc additions to the case file, it also has the effect of 
preventing evidence obtained by the accused from being accorded 
an equal place in the records on which the court relies so heavily 
during the proceedings. 
Furthermore, the Code gives the contents of the case file a 
presumptively special status as evidence.  Article 74 defines 
evidence and then lists all the items that are considered to be 
“admissible evidence,” among them “testimony” given by a victim, 
witness, or expert.  But testimony of a witness is itself defined in a 
specific way by Article 79 as “information communicated by a 
witness during questioning conducted in the course of the pretrial 
process in the criminal case or in court in accordance with the 
requirements of Articles 187-191.”  These cited articles govern 
procedures for questioning of witnesses by the criminal 
investigator during the preliminary investigation.  None of them 
foresee the participation of the defense.
40
     
The quasi-judicial screening and verification functions the 
investigator performs are emphasized in the Code‟s provisions on 
“verification of evidence.”  These provisions require the 
investigator not only to collect but also to verify whatever 
information is obtained.  This presumably is what turns the 
                                                 
40 Art. 190(2) provides that the official record must indicate questions that “were 
excluded by the investigator,” presumably questions submitted by defense 
counsel.  However, as noted, infra, defense counsel may not be present or 
otherwise participate in the interrogation absent the investigator‟s consent.  
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information into “admissible evidence.”  According to Article 87, 
verification is performed “by comparing it to other evidence 
available in the criminal case file and also by identifying its source 
and obtaining other evidence that corroborates or contradicts the 
evidence being reviewed.”  Based on the foregoing, witness 
statements – having been “verified” and converted into “evidence” 
by the criminal investigator during the preliminary investigation – 
would seem to be sufficient alone to convict the defendant at trial.   
At least under circumstances in which such evidence is the 
main basis for a conviction, such a practice would seem to violate 
Art. 6 § 3(d) because this testimony may be used to convict the 
defendant without the opportunity for the defendant to confront the 
witness.  This violation is discussed in more detail below.   
Such a presumption also violates Article 6 § 2.  When the 
products of the non-adversarial investigation – by reason of their 
having been processed by the investigator – can be used at trial as 
evidence of guilt, that “investigation” process becomes more than 
just a vehicle for finding out information.  It serves an “early trial” 
function by transforming the information compiled in the case file 
into “pre-admitted” evidence ready for use at trial.  In other words, 
because of the continuing privileges accorded by law to the 
investigator (remnants of the presumption of objectivity and 
neutrality accorded the investigator under inquisitorial principles 
now ostensibly foresworn by the Russian Constitution and Code of 
Criminal Procedure, as noted below), the evidence is presumed to 
be authenticated (“verified”), a judicial function assumed by a 
party in the proceedings.  No such legal presumption is accorded to 
evidence obtained by the defense, rendering its evidence, in 
Bulgakov‟s famous words, “of the second freshness.”41 
                                                 
41
 MIKHAIL BULGAKOV, THE MASTER AND MARGARITA 222 (Mirra Ginsburg, 






77 CRIMINAL CASE N 1-23/10 
D.  ARTICLE 6 § 3 – THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY OF ARMS 
  
1.  Relevant Russian Law and Practice 
 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation states, in relevant 
part: 
 
Article 123 § 3 
Judicial proceedings shall be conducted based on 
adversarial principles and equality of the parties. 
 
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 
the Russian Federation are as follows: 
 
Article 15  
1.  Judicial proceedings in criminal cases shall be 
conducted in accordance with adversarial principles. 
2.  The functions of prosecution, defense, and 
adjudication of a criminal  case shall be separate 
from each other and those functions may not be 
allocated to any single agency or official. 
3.  A court is not an organ of criminal prosecution 
and shall not take the prosecution or defense side in 
a case.  The court shall create the conditions 
necessary for the parties to perform their procedural 
duties and to exercise the rights granted to them. 
4.  The prosecution and the defense shall have equal 
rights before the court. 
 
                                                                                                             
manager. 'My good man, that‟s nonsense!' 'What‟s nonsense?' 'Second freshness 
– that's nonsense! There is only one kind of freshness – first.  And that‟s the last, 
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Article 53 § 1(2) 
From the time when defense counsel is permitted to 
participate in a criminal case, he has the right … to 
gather and present such evidence as is necessary to 
provide legal representation, in accordance with the 





1.  All evidence in the trial of a criminal case shall 
be subjected to first-hand examination, except as 
specified in Section X of this Code.  The court must 
hear the testimony of the defendant, the victim and 
witnesses, and opinions of any expert, must inspect 
the physical evidence, must read aloud official 
records and other documents, and must conduct 
other judicial actions to examine the evidence. 
2.  Testimony given during the preliminary 
investigation may be read aloud only in the 
situations specified in Articles 276 and 281 of this 
Code. 
3.  A court judgment may be based solely on the 
evidence examined at the trial. 
 
Article 281 
1.  Reading testimony aloud that was previously 
given by a victim or witness during the preliminary 
investigation or at trial, showing photographic 
negatives and prints or slides made in the course of 
the questioning or playing back audio and/or video 
                                                 
42
 A fourth section to this article was introduced by Federal Law № 39-FZ of 20 
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recordings or showing film of the questioning is 
allowed, with the consent of the parties, in the event 
of the victim‟s or witness‟ failure to appear in court, 
with the exception of the situations specified in part 
two of this Article. 
2.  In the event of the victim‟s or witness‟s failure to 
appear for trial and on motion of a party or on its 
own initiative, the court makes a decision to read 
their previous testimony aloud in cases when there 
is a: 
1) death of the victim or witness; 
2) severe illness precluding appearance in court; 
3) refusal of the foreign national victim or  
   witness to appear pursuant to a court subpoena; 
4) natural disaster or other exceptional circum- 
   stances precluding the appearance in court. 
3.  On motion of a party, the court may make a 
decision to read testimony aloud that was 
previously given by a victim or witness during the 
preliminary investigation or at trial, if there are 
substantial contradictions between the testimony 
given previously and the one given in court. 
4.  The refusal of a witness or victim to testify in 
court shall not preclude the reading of his 
preliminary investigation testimony aloud, if the 
testimony was obtained in accord with the 
requirements of Article 11(2) of this Code. 
5.  Showing negatives and photographs, or slides 
made in the course of questioning, playing back 
audio and/or video recordings or showing film of 






 KAHN 80 
reading aloud the testimony included in the 
appropriate official record of the questioning or the 
official record of the trial. 
 
Article 285 
1.  Official records of investigative actions, an 
expert‟s opinion given in the course of a 
preliminary investigation, as well as other 
documents included in the criminal case file or 
presented at a trial may be read aloud in full or in 
part, pursuant to a ruling or order of the court, if 
they set forth or certify circumstances that are 
relevant to the criminal case. 
2.  Official records of investigative actions, an 
expert‟s opinion, and other documents shall be read 
aloud by the party who requested such reading or by 
the court. 
 
2.  Relevant ECHR Provisions and Case Law 
 
Article 6 § 3 of the Convention states, in relevant part, that:  
 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights: … (d) to examine or 
have examined witnesses against him and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him; 
 
“While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does 
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which is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under national 
law.”  Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97 (12 May 
2000), at ¶ 34 (internal citations omitted).  The Court has 
emphasized its distinct role, which is not “to determine, as a matter 
of principle, whether particular types of evidence – for example, 
unlawfully obtained evidence – may be admissible or, indeed, 
whether the applicant was guilty or not,” but rather “whether the 
proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence 
was obtained, were fair.”  Id.  By this is meant the observance of 
the obligation to ensure the right to a fair trial undertaken by the 
member states to the Convention.  In light of that distinction, “[t]he 
Court may overlook minor infringements provided that overall the 
proceedings were fair and, conversely, unfairness may still arise 
even though the relevant formal requirements may have been 
complied with.”  Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European 
Court of Human Rights 253 (2d ed. 2005).  
Although neither of the phrases “adversarial principles” nor 
“equality of arms” appears in the Convention, both terms have 
been held to be incorporated into the right to a fair hearing 
protected by Article 6.  See Nuala Mole & Catharina Harby, The 
Right to a Fair Trial: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights 46 (2006); Clare Ovey 
& Robin C. A. White, The European Convention on Human Rights 
176 (2006).  The language of Article 6 § 3 reflects the fact that, 
although civil-law and common-law countries are both represented 
in the member states party to the Convention, their approaches to 
criminal justice are not the same.  Russian criminal procedure has 
drawn from both approaches, although it has been more heavily 
influenced by the former, civil-law tradition.  Whether to adopt 
common law or continental approaches to the admissibility of 
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national law.  See, e.g., Schenk v. Switzerland, App. No. 10862/84 
(12 July 1988), at ¶ 46; Windisch v. Austria, App. No. 12489/86 
(27 September 1990), at ¶ 25.      
The European Court has interpreted the right to adversarial 
proceedings primarily as “the opportunity to have knowledge of 
and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced 
by the other party.”  Rowe & Davis v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
28901/95 (16 Feb. 2000) at ¶ 60.  This does not necessarily 
translate into a right to confront live witnesses at trial.  Indeed, 
were it otherwise, such a conclusion would render a court‟s 
reliance on the case file (delo) a per se violation.  Delta v. France, 
App. No. 11444/85 (19 Dec. 1990), at ¶ 36.  The use at trial of 
witness statements obtained during the preliminary investigation 
will not contravene either § 1 or § 3(d) of Article 6 of the 
Convention “provided the rights of the defence have been 
respected.”  Id.  In the Court‟s words, “[a]s a rule, these rights 
require that an accused should be given an adequate and proper 
opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either 
at the time the witness makes his statement or at some later stage 
of the proceedings.”  Id.  Similarly, the Strasbourg Court has 
interpreted equality of arms to require that “each party must be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under 
conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis his 
opponent.”  Bulut v. Austria, App. No. 59/1994/506/588 (22 Feb. 
1996), at ¶ 47.   
Among the first cases before the European Court on this right 
to confrontation in adversarial proceedings was Unterpertinger v. 
Austria, App. No. 9120/80 (24 Nov. 1986) at ¶ 33.
43
  The applicant  
                                                 
43
 A contemporaneous case, Asch v. Austria, reached the conclusion on similar 
facts that no violation occurred.  Professor Trechsel has described this judgment 
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was convicted of assaulting two family members who gave 
statements to the police but refused to testify.  Under the relevant 
domestic law, the applicant had no opportunity to confront them, 
although their statements were read out in court.  The Court 
unanimously found a violation of Article 6.  The rule established 
by the Court is: 
 
If the defendant has been given an adequate and 
proper opportunity to challenge the depositions, 
either when made or at a later stage, their admission 
in evidence will not in itself contravene Article 6 §§ 
1 and 3 (d). The corollary of that, however, is that 
where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive 
degree on depositions that have been made by a 
person whom the accused has had no opportunity to 
examine or to have examined, whether during the 
investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence 
are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with 
the guarantees provided by Article 6. 
 
Luca v. Italy, App. No. 33354/96 (27 Feb. 2001), at ¶ 40 
(citations omitted).  In short, a conviction based “either solely or to 
a decisive extent” on testimony that the defense is not given the 
opportunity to confront violates the Convention, a conclusion that 
the Court has reiterated many times.  See, e.g., A.M. v. Italy, App. 
No. 37019/97 (14 Dec. 1999) at ¶ 25; P.S. v. Germany, App. No. 
33900/96 (20 Dec. 2001), at ¶ 24; Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United 
Kingdom, App. Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06 (20 Jan. 2009), at ¶¶ 
                                                                                                             
regarded as an unfortunate mistake.”  Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in 






 KAHN 84 
34-36.
44
  As Judge Trechsel has observed, “For the domestic 
courts, the lesson is simple enough: the judgment should not refer 
to the untested statement. … If the remaining evidence is 
insufficient, it will have to acquit.”  Stefan Trechsel, Human 
Rights in Criminal Proceedings 298 (2005).
45
 
One of the Court‟s most recent judgments against Russia, the 
Ilyadi case, highlights this problem.  Yuriy Ilyadi was convicted of 
selling a forged promissory note.  The primary evidence against 
him was the testimony of a Captain P., who testified that he was a 
Russian law enforcement officer who posed as the purchaser of the 
note.  Captain P.‟s testimony took the form of a written record of 
an interview given to an investigator during the pre-trial 
investigation.  Captain P. did not appear at trial; rather, the pre-trial 
statement was read out in his absence.  The defense did not object 
to the reading of this record, although Ilyadi later grew suspicious 
enough of P.‟s absence to engage in independent efforts to obtain 
information about Captain P.‟s whereabouts or even his existence, 
which were rebuffed.  The failure of P. to testify in person was the 
basis for Ilyadi‟s appeal, which the court summarily rejected. 
The European Court found a violation of the general 
requirement of fairness found in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.  
The Court specifically noted that “the applicant did not have an 
opportunity to examine or to have examined Captain P. at any 
stage of the proceedings.  During the investigation, the investigator 
took down Captain P.‟s statement but did not arrange for a 
                                                 
44
 This judgment has been referred to the Grand Chamber, before which a 
hearing was held on 19 May 2010.  Its judgment remained pending at the time 
this report was submitted. 
45
 Judge Trechsel notes, as a general matter, that there is “a tendency of 
increasingly allowing courts to rely on the file rather than live evidence.  It is my 
view that this is not compatible with the spirit of the various international 
human-rights instruments and, more particularly, with the case-law of the 
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confrontation between him and the applicant.”  Ilyadi v. Russia, 
App. No. 6642/05 (5 May 2011), at ¶ 41.  Because the evidence 
leading to concrete suspicions about Captain P.‟s existence was not 
finally obtained by the defense until after Ilyadi‟s conviction, the 
Court found a violation of Article 6 in the appellate court‟s failure 
to give “a sufficiently specific and explicit reply” to Ilyadi‟s appeal 
on this point. 
This case illustrates the potential for a confrontation issue to 
present both a violation of the general fairness guarantees of 
Article 6 § 1 and the right to equality of arms guaranteed by 
Article 6 § 3. 
It should be noted that in at least one Russian case before the 
Strasbourg Court, defense counsel‟s willingness to begin a judicial 
proceeding in the absence of a witness whose testimony was then 
read from the case file, and subsequent failure to object to 
concluding the proceeding despite the witness‟s continued absence, 
was deemed to constitute waiver of the defendant‟s right to 
confront a live witness.  Andandonskiy v. Russia, App. No. 
24015/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 Sept. 2006), at ¶ 54.  The Court 
concluded that there was no violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention.  It is not possible to determine from the materials 
provided and in the time allotted whether such a waiver would 
apply to this case.   
 
3.  Analysis 
 
In the present case, the use of numerous witness statements 
found only in the case file, if not subject to confrontation by the 
defendants, likely violates the Convention, even though under 
Russian law they are considered to be admissible evidence by 
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case file.  Thus, the Khamovnichesky Court relies in its verdict on 
the following: 
 
(a) Testimony of Douglas Miller 
Douglas Miller, an employee of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, was 
described by the court as “the main auditor” of the company for the 
consolidated financial reporting of OAO NK Yukos.  His 
testimony is described as “read out in the course of the court 
hearing pursuant to Article 281” on pages 136, 184, 185, 345, 347, 
464, 545-572, 563, 565, 573, 580-582, and 601 of the verdict.
46
  
This testimony was also used by the court to reject the testimony of 
another PriceWaterhouseCoopers witness, Stephen Wilson (see 
Verdict, p. 624-25) and the testimony of the defendants (see p. 668 
& 669).  Documentary evidence was also obtained during Miller‟s 
examination (see p. 599).   
In its objections to a motion filed by the prosecution on 11 
December 2009, the defense averred that Miller was a “principal 
prosecution witness,” as evidenced by his frequent mention (56 
times according to the defense) in the indictment.  According to the 
same defense document, the investigator denied a request by the 
defense to conduct a confrontation between Khodorkovsky and 
Miller.  This document further asserted that four interrogations of 
this witness were omitted from the case file in the defendants‟ 
case, notwithstanding their relevance.
47
   
                                                 
46
 On page 441, the court refers to the “testimony of the auditor Douglas Miller,” 
and, on page 597, the court refers to “testimony by witness D.R. Miller,” 
suggesting that Miller appeared in open court to give evidence.  Likewise, at 
page 614, the court refers to “the evidence produced during court hearing (vol. 
132 c.f.s. 20-24) by witness D.R. Miller.”  As noted in the text accompanying 
footnote 38, infra, this does not appear to have been the case. 
47
 It is difficult to assess this document, obtained on the website recommended 
by the Council, because it is not linked to any response by the Khamovnichesky 
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According to a press release by the defendants, “Before Miller 
left Russia, he was interrogated no less than four times by 
prosecution investigators between May 2007 and January 2008 
without Khodorkovsky, Lebedev or their defense lawyers being 
informed and without any opportunity to question Miller or to 
attend the interrogations. Subsequently, the prosecution 
unjustifiably rejected Khodorkovsky's request to confront Miller 
through a Russian procedure whereby a defendant agrees to answer 
questions put to both the defendant and the witness.”48   
 
 (b)  Testimony of Alla Karaseva 
Alla Karaseva was described by the court variously as an 
employee of JV RTT, OOO Yukos Invest, OOO YuFK, Director 
General of OOO Forest oil, OOO Virtus, and OOO Grace.  Her 
testimony is referenced as “given by her in the course of the pre-
trial investigation and read out in the court hearing pursuant to 
Article 281” on pages 173-175, 321-323 of the verdict.  In 
addition, the court references inculpatory statements about the 
defendants made in the verdict of the Basmanny District Court of 
the City of Moscow, which found Ms. Karaseva guilty of fraud and 
tax evasion (see p. 323).
49
   
                                                                                                             
prosecution‟s motion.  See Courtroom update: December 11, 2009, 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Communications Center, 14 December 2009, 
http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/content/courtroom-report-december-11-
2009.  The verdict of the Khamovnichesky court does not appear to distinguish 
any transcripts obtained through the defense team‟s efforts. 
48
 See Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev Defense Team Seeks 
Testimony, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Communications Center, 14 December 
2009, http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/news-resources/stories/mikhail-
khodorkovsky-and-platon-lebedev-defense-team-seeks-testimony.   
49
 Similarly, although V.G. Malakhovsky, whom the court found to be a member 
of the organized criminal group, was examined in court (see p. 261), the verdict 
references a wide variety of court records of Malakhovsky‟s criminal case 
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According to a press release by the defendants, the court 
indicated receipt of a letter from Ms. Karaseva stating that she 
could not attend the trial due to medical reasons.  The court then 
admitted the transcripts of her pre-trial examination over the 
objections of the defense, who averred no opportunity to confront 
the witness, whose interrogation occurred as part of a different 
case after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation in the 
defendants‟ case.50   
 
(c)  Testimony of N. N. Logachev 
N.N. Logachev is described by the court as the Director 
General and Manager of OAO Tomskneft VNK.  This testimony is 
referenced as “given during preliminary investigation … and read 
out in court session in accordance with Article 281” on pages 288-
289, and 621 of the verdict.  This testimony was also used by the 
court to reject the testimony given by defence witnesses T.R. 
Gilmanov and P.A. Anisimov, who are described as former 
executives of OAO Yuganskneftegas and OAO Samaraneftegas 
(see p. 620).  This testimony was also used to reject arguments 
made by the defendants (see p. 651, 674, 675 (where it is described 
only as “testimony”)).  This testimony is also used to conclude that 
the defendants committed the crimes alleged in the indictment as 
part of an organized group, which under the Criminal Code 
augmented the punishment (see p. 679). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
inculpatory statements (see p. 269, 270, 277, 298, 317, 433, 505, 506, 507, 510, 
512, 517), and to reject arguments made by the defence (see p. 630).   
50
 See Courtroom Report: February 4, 2010, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev 
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(d)  Testimony of N. I. Vlasova 
N.I. Vlasova was described by the court as “working in the tax 
department of OOO Yukos-Moscow”.  Her testimony is referenced 
as “made public in the court session in line with Article 281 of the 
CCP of the RF, which she gave during the preliminary 
investigation,” on pages 355-356 of the verdict.  According to a 
press release by the defendants, the prosecution indicated receipt of 
a letter from Ms. Vlasova in which she declined to attend the court 
hearing due to health reasons.  The defense did not object to the 
transcript of her interrogation, but did note that the transcript came 
from a different case, obtained after the preliminary investigation 
of the defendants had ended.  The prosecution‟s motion to add the 
material to the case file was granted.
51
   
 
(e)  Testimony of Antonio Valdes Garcia 
Antonio Valdes Garcia is described by the court as a defendant  
“in regard to whom the proceedings on the criminal case have been 
suspended”.  His testimony was relied upon by the court on pages 
229-230, 257-258, 317-318, 433-434, 505, and 512 of the verdict.  
Valdes Garcia was subsequently found guilty in absentia by the 
Basmanny District Court of the City of Moscow on 18 July 2011.
52
  
The court omits mention of the fact that Valdes Garcia suffered 
serious physical injuries while in the custody of Russian authorities 
in 2005 and fled Russia during his trial in 2007.
53
   
                                                 
51
 See Courtroom Report: February 17, 2010, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev 




 See  Spanish citizen pronounced a new guilty party in YUKOS case, ITAR-
TASS, 19 July 2011, http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c142/188420_print.html.   
53
 See Ekaterina Zapodinskaya, Khodorkovsky Accomplice Makes a Break, 
Kommersant”, 16 January 2007, 
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(f)  Other Witness Testimony 
In addition to these witnesses, the Khamovnichesky court read 
out from the case file the written testimony of a number of other 
important witnesses.  For example, the testimony of A.A. Shavrin 
and O.K. Yegorova, lawyers with the firm ALM Feldmans, was 
read from the 2006 court records of the Basmanny District Court in 
the criminal case against Valdes Garcia, Malakhovsky, and 
Pereverzin.  See Verdict, pages 270 and 510-511.   
Similarly, the court refers to “the evidence produced by witness 
S.I. Vorobyeva, given during court hearing at the Basmanny 
District Court” in the same case.  See Verdict, page 506.  The court 
refers to “evidence produced by witness E.V. Agranovskaya” in 
the same way.  See Verdict, page 507-508.   
The Khamovnichesky court‟s verdict records that “[r]ead out 
during court hearing was the testimony produced by the P.P. Ivlev, 
a Deputy Managing Partner of ALM Feldmans,” but does not refer 
to any source from which this testimony was obtained.  See 
Verdict, page 508. 
Citing Article 281, the Khamovnichesky court also “read out at 
the court session” the testimony given during the pre-trial 
investigation by witness N. M. Petrosian.  See Verdict, pages 466-
467, 508-509, 512-513.  
 
* * * 
 
 In its many references to Article 281, the verdict never 
identifies which of the four relevant circumstances envisioned by 
that article the court intends to support its use of testimony from 
persons who did not appear at trial.  In the case of Antonio Valdes 
Garcia, for example, it may be that the court concluded that § 2(3) 
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was called as a witness, or perhaps ordered to appear pursuant to a 
court subpoena.  On the other hand, § 2(4) of that article may have 
been applied.  Under an interpretation of the Russian Supreme 
Court, the need of a witness to travel a long distance was accepted 
as an “exceptional circumstance[] precluding the appearance in 
court” of the witness and therefore permitting the use of his 
previously obtained written testimony under § 2(4) of Article 281.  
See Opredelenie ot 10.11.06.  Sudebnaya kollegiya po ugolovnym 
delam, kassatsiya (Dokladchik: Yakovlev Vyacheslav 
Ksenofontovich) (“With account for the remoteness of the location 
of the witnesses and the adoption of all possible means to transport 
them, the court found exceptional circumstances prevented their 
appearance in court, which in accordance with paragraph 4 of part 
2 of Article 281 UPK RF is the foundation for the reading out of 
their testimony by motion of the prosecution.”).  The 
Khamovnichesky court does not indicate – neither for Valdes 
Garcia nor for any other witness – the specific reason it invokes 
that article. 
Sometimes, the verdict references testimony read out pursuant 
to Article 281, when the only possible basis could be found in § 3 
of that article: by the motion of a party on the grounds of 
substantial contradictions between the testimony given previously 
and the one given in court.  Thus, the verdict references “the 
testimony of witness A.D. Golubovich examined at the court 
session, as well as from the records of 09.04.2008 and 05.05.2008 
of him being examined as a witness during the pre-trial 
investigation read out at the court session under Article 281 of the 
RF Code of Criminal Procedure” (see p. 402).54  No indication is 
                                                 
54
 Sections 2 and 4 would not seem to apply since the verdict indicates that 
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made as to the “substantial contradictions” that would permit this 
reading under Russian law. 
It is difficult for this report to make categorical conclusions as 
to these potential violations on the basis of the verdict alone.  It 
would appear, however, that the testimony read out from the case 
file alone comprises a substantial portion of the evidence used to 
convict the defendants.  This is especially so given the key nature 
of the positions held by the individuals on whose testimony the 
verdict relies to establish the defendants‟ guilt.  The one-sided use 
of this evidence constitutes a violation of equality of arms under 
the Convention. 
 
E.  ARTICLE 7 
  
1.  RELEVANT RUSSIAN LAW AND PRACTICE 
 
The Defendants were convicted, inter alia, of violating Article 
160(3)(a) & (b) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, as 
amended by Federal Law No. 63-FZ of 13.06.1996, which 
provides: 
Article 160 
1.  Misappropriation or Embezzlement is the theft 
of another‟s property that has been entrusted to the 
perpetrator –  * * * 
3.  Acts, foreseen in the first or second parts of this 
article, if they are committed: 
(a) by an organized group; 
(b) on a large scale; 
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Article 158, Note 1 
By theft [хищение] in the articles of the present 
Code is understood the self-interested, unlawful, 
uncompensated withdrawal and (or) conversion of 
someone else‟s property to the benefit of the 
perpetrator or other persons, which causes damage 
to the owner or other possessor of this property. 
 
The elements of embezzlement were the subject of a decision 
of the Plenum of the Supreme Court, “On judicial practice in cases 
of fraud, misappropriation and embezzlement,” No. 51 (27 
December 2007), the relevant portions of which provide: 
 
1.  Courts should pay attention to the fact that, 
unlike other forms of theft foreseen in chapter 21 of 
the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, fraud 
[мошенничество – the crime defined in Article 159 
of the Criminal Code] is accomplished by way of 
deception or breach of trust, under the influence of 
which the owner of the property or another person 
or authority conveys the property or the right to it to 
other persons or does not impede the withdrawal of 
this property or acquisition of rights to it by other 
persons. * * *  
6.  Theft of another‟s property or the acquisition of 
the right to it by way of deception or breach of trust, 
which is accomplished with the use by this person 
of forged official documents that concede a right or 
free from responsibility qualifies as an aggregate 
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and the corresponding part of Article 159 CC RF. * 
* * 
8.  In the case of the creation of a commercial 
enterprise without the intention to actually conduct 
business or banking activity, which has the aim of 
theft of another‟s property or the acquisition of the 
right to it, its commission is completely covered by 
fraud [мошенничество].  The given act should 
additionally be qualified under Article 173 CC RF 
as a false private enterprise only in the case of the 
real aggregate of the named crime, when the person 
receives something else, which is not connected 
with the theft of the property benefit (e.g. when the 
false private enterprise is created by the person not 
only for the completion of the theft of another‟s 
property, but also with the aim of a tax shelter or 
cover for prohibited activity, if as a result of the 
given activity, which is not connected to the theft of 
another‟s property, there was caused a large-scale 
damage to citizens, organizations or the state, as 
foreseen in Article 173 CC RF). * * * 
18.  The wrongful free conversion of property that 
has been entrusted to a person to his own advantage 
or the advantage of another person, which has 
caused damage to the owner or other lawful 
possessor of this property, should be qualified by 
judges as misappropriation or embezzlement [under 
Article 160 of the Criminal Code], provided that the 
stolen property was in the lawful possession or 
authority of this person, who by virtue of his office 
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exercised power by order, administration, delivery, 
use or custody in relation to someone‟s property. 
Deciding a question about the outer boundaries of 
the make-up of misappropriation or embezzlement 
from theft, courts should establish the presence of a 
person with the above named powers.  The 
accomplishment of a secret theft of another person‟s 
property by a person who does not possess such 
powers, but who has access to the stolen property 
by virtue of the carrying out of his work or other 
circumstances, should be qualified under Article 
158 CC RF. 
19.  In the examination of cases about crimes 
foreseen in Article 160 CC RF, courts should bear 
in mind that misappropriation consists in the 
uncompensated, self-interested completion of the 
wrongful conversion by a person of property 
entrusted to him to his benefit against the will of the 
owner. 
The crime of misappropriation is considered to be 
completed from the moment when the lawful 
possession of the property entrusted to the person 
becomes wrongful and the person begins to carry 
out acts that are directed toward conversion of the 
given property to his benefit (e.g., from the moment 
when the person by way of forgery hides the 
presence with him of the entrusted property, or from 
the moment of the non-performance of the person‟s 
duty to place monetary resources of this person in 
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As embezzlement should be qualified wrongful acts 
of a person who out of self-interest expends 
property entrusted to him against the will of the 
owner by use of this property, its expenditure, or 
transfer to another person.  * * * 
20.  Deciding the question about the presence in 
actions composing a theft in the form of 
misappropriation or embezzlement, the court should 
establish the circumstances that confirm that the 
intent of the person enveloped the wrongful, 
uncompensated character of the actions that were 
accomplished with the aim to turn the property 
entrusted to him to his own benefit or that of 
another. 
The purposefulness of the intent in each such case 
must be determined by a court out of concrete 
circumstances of the case, for example, the presence 
for a person of the real possibility to return property 
to its owner, the completion by him of attempts by 
way of forgery, or other ways to hide his actions. 
In this, courts must take into account that the partial 
reimbursement of damage to the victim by itself is 
not evidence of the absence of the person‟s intent 
for misappropriation or embezzlement of the 
property entrusted to him. 
 
2.  RELEVANT ECHR PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW 
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No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence 
on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time when it was 
committed. 
 
The protection provided by this article is understood to be “an 
essential element of the rule of law, … as is underlined by the fact 
that no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 (art. 15) 
in time of war or other public emergency.  It should be construed 
and applied, as follows from its object and purpose, in such a way 
as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, 
conviction and punishment.” S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
47/1994/494/576 (27 Oct. 1995), at ¶ 34. 
Article 7 embodies the principle “that the criminal law must 
not be extensively construed to an accused‟s detriment, for 
instance by analogy”.  Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88 
(25 May 1993), at ¶ 52.  The European Court also understands this 
right to include the principle that the offence “must be clearly 
defined in law.”  Id.; see also Moiseyev v. Russia, App. No. 
62936/00 (6 Apr. 2009), at ¶ 233.  An offence is clearly defined in 
law under circumstances “where the individual can know from the 
wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the 
assistance of the courts‟ interpretation of it, what acts and 
omissions will make him criminally liable.” Id.   
It follows from these principles that the criminal law must 
possess the quality of foreseeability.  This means that although the 
judicial authority might engage in the case-by-case clarification of 
an offence in response to changing social circumstances, the 
resulting interpretation must be “consistent with the essence of the 
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App. No. 62936/00 (6 Apr. 2009), at ¶ 234.  The European Court 
will ask “whether the applicant‟s acts, at the time when they were 
committed, constituted criminal offences defined with sufficient 
accessibility and foreseeability by Russian or international law.”  
Id. at ¶ 235. 
The evolution of judicial interpretation of the criminal law has 
been found to be reasonably foreseeable when “consistent with the 
very essence of the offence” and the conduct in question is 
generally “within the scope of the offence.”  S.W. v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 47/1994/494/576 (27 Oct. 1995), at ¶ 43.  This 
exception, however, was made in a case in which only the 
existence of an affirmative defense, not the essential elements of 
the crime, were in doubt.   In that case, the European Court found 
no violation of Article 7 in the denial to the applicant of the marital 
immunity defense to the charge of raping his wife because the 
“essentially debasing character of rape is so manifest” regardless 
of the marital relationship and, thus, the conviction of the applicant 
could not “be said to be at variance with the object and purpose of 
Article 7 (art. 7) of the Convention, namely to ensure that no one 
should be subjected to arbitrary prosecution, conviction or 
punishment”.  Id., at ¶ 43-44. 
The European Court has found that a criminal law “may still 
satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person 
concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a 
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail.”  Cantoni v. France, App. No. 
45/1995/551/637 (22 Oct. 1996), at ¶ 35.  The European Court 
noted, in particular, that “persons carrying on a professional 
activity” may “be expected to take special care in assessing the 
risks that such activity entails.” Id.  In that case, however, the 
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thirty years the relevant domestic cassational court “had adopted a 
clear position on this matter, which with the passing of time 
became even more firmly established.”  Id. at ¶ 34. 
 
3.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Court convicted Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, as part of an 
“organized criminal group,” for the crime of embezzlement under 
Article 160 CC RF.  Embezzlement is defined in that article as “the 
theft of another‟s property that has been entrusted to the 
perpetrator.”  Theft, in turn, is defined to be “the self-interested, 
unlawful, uncompensated withdrawal and (or) conversion of 
someone else‟s property to the benefit of the perpetrator or other 
persons, which causes damage to the owner or other possessor of 
this property.”  According to the RF Supreme Court, a conviction 
for embezzlement under Article 160 requires the “uncompensated, 
self-interested completion of the wrongful conversion by a person 
of property entrusted to him to his benefit against the will of the 
owner.” 
The property Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were convicted of 
embezzling was oil.  (Verdict, p. 3)  The victims of this theft were 
three oil-producing companies, OAO Yuganskneftegas, OAO 
Samaraneftegas, and OAO Tomskneft VNK.  (Verdict, p. 6)   
The court‟s description of the defendants‟ modus operandi may 
be summarized as follows: 
1) The defendants, through OAO NK Yukos, became 
majority shareholders in the three oil companies, 
which consequently became subsidiaries in Yukos‟s 
complex corporate structure under the external 
administration of one of Yukos‟s management 
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2) Having “acquired the right to the strategic 
management of OAO NK Yukos,” the defendants 
then persuaded the relevant boards of directors and 
shareholders of the three oil companies to enter into 
contracts for the sale of their oil to Yukos (Verdict, 
p. 9).  The court found that the defendants had paid 
off various participants in these meetings to “secure 
the adoption of the indicated unlawful and 
groundless decisions” (p. 11); 
3) The contracts indicated “that the transfer of the right 
of ownership to the output, extracted as part of the 
oil-well fluid, from the oil production companies, 
appearing in the capacity of the seller, to OAO NK 
Yukos, appearing in the capacity of the purchaser, 
shall take place at the head of each concrete well 
promptly after its extraction from under the 
ground.”  (Verdict, p. 10)   
This theory of the defendants‟ criminal liability under Article 
160 was unforeseeable, and thus a violation of Article 7 of the 
Convention.  First, the theory is premised on the omission or 
admitted non-existence of the traditional elements of the crime:   
1) The element of “another’s property.”  As noted, 
the defendants, through Yukos, were alleged to 
have obtained by a series of contracts “the transfer 
of the right of ownership” to the oil companies‟ 
production.  A person cannot embezzle from 
himself.  In order to satisfy this element, i.e. to 
show that the oil belonged to someone other than 
the defendants, the verdict concludes that although 
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NK Yukos; however, it was not the oil owner de 
jure.  In reality, the oil belonged to its producing 
subsidiaries,” i.e. the victims of the embezzlement.  
See Verdict, p. 660.  The verdict refers to two legal 
sources in support of this legal conclusion: the 
judgment of 26 May 2004 by the Moscow City 
Commercial Court against Yukos, and a decision of 
the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, No. 
138-O (25 July 2001) mentioned in that judgment. 
 Neither legal source supports this bifurcated 
concept of simultaneous de facto/de jure ownership.  
During the 2004 tax proceedings, the Moscow City 
Commercial Court rejected the defendant‟s 
argument that the victims and other companies were 
the true owners of the oil because those 
organizations “never acquired any rights of 
ownership, use and disposal in respect of oil and oil 
products.”55  These are the rights that define 
ownership under Article 209 of the Civil Code.  
Likewise, the Constitutional Court determination 
[«определение»] nowhere references this 
distinction.  Rather, that determination concerned 
whether a previously rendered ruling 
[«постановление»] about tax charges against the 
checking accounts of bona fide taxpayers could be 
applied to non-bona fide taxpayers. 
 It could not be said to be foreseeable that a 
contract for the sale of oil would be interpreted to 
                                                 
55
 This quotation is taken from the extensive citation to that judgment found in 
OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04 (20 Sept. 
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establish only de facto ownership of the object of 
these completed transactions in the defendants, but 
not the de jure ownership that the Khamovnichesky 
Court asserts to remain with the oil production 
companies. 
2) The element of “entrusted to the perpetrator.”  
By definition, a person cannot be “entrusted” with a 
thing over which he is the owner.  The verdict twice 
asserts that some contracts were procured in a 
manner rendering them void ab initio 
[«ничтожен»] under Russian law.  See verdict, pp. 
90, 648.  The court‟s theory seems to be that the 
void contracts did not transfer ownership; thus, the 
defendants were entrusted with oil that actually 
belonged to the victims.  Neither of these two 
assertions in the verdict is sound.   
 The first reference is to contracts implicated in 
the money-laundering charges, not the 
embezzlement charges, and thus is not relevant.
56
  
The second reference could refer to embezzlement, 
although the verdict is unclear.  The verdict states 
on the preceding page that the defendants are guilty 
of embezzlement “by way of execution of numerous 
wrongful transactions in violation of Art. 179 of the 
Civil Code.”57  See verdict, p. 647.  But Article 179 
does not state that such contracts are void, only that 
                                                 
56
 The Court cites Article 170 of the Civil Code, under which “a fictitious 
transaction, that is, a transaction concluded only for form, without the intention 
to create legal consequences corresponding to it, shall be void.” 
57
 A similar conclusion is also stated on page 12, also citing Art. 179.  Article 
179 of the Criminal Code establishes the crime of coercing a transaction through 
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they are voidable by a court upon the suit of the 
victim [«может быть признана судом 
недействительной по иску потерпевшего»].  If 
such a suit was not brought (and there is no mention 
of one in these sections of the verdict), one would 
now appear to be time-barred.
58
  The verdict makes 
several references to Article 10 of the Civil Code, 
but these are equally unavailing.
59
   
 By the court‟s own conclusion, therefore, 
ownership of the oil was transferred by these 
contracts.  If indeed ownership was transferred, the 
defendants could not have been “entrusted” with the 
property of another and this element of the crime 
                                                 
58Article 181(2) provides that “A suit to deem a contested transaction to be 
invalid and concerning the application of the consequences of its invalidity may 
be brought within a year from the date of the termination of the coercion or 
threat under whose influence the transaction was concluded (Article 179[1]), or 
from the date when the plaintiff knew or should have known about other 
circumstances which are the grounds for deeming the transaction to be invalid.”  
59
 The verdict frequently asserts that Article 10 of the Civil Code has been 
contravened by the defendants‟ actions.  See Verdict, pp. 12, 35, 543, 659, 665.  
Article 10 states in relevant part that “The actions of citizens and juridical 
persons effectuated exclusively with the intention to cause harm to another 
person, and also abuse of right in other forms, shall not be permitted.”   
 The court‟s legal analysis, when conducted at all, is perfunctory and 
inconsistent with the requirements of the Code.  Although Article 10 of the Code 
states that actions “effectuated exclusively with the intent to cause harm” [in 
Russian: « осуществляемые исключительно с намерением причинить вред 
другому лицу»] are prohibited, the verdict concludes only that the defendants 
“were simultaneously acting with intent to cause harm to another person” (p. 12) 
and “acted concurrently with the intent to cause harm to another person in 
violation of Article 10” (p. 665) [in both cases «одновременно действовали»] 
(the italicization of these adverbs has been added for emphasis).  The verdict‟s 
conclusion that any intent to cause harm was not exclusive acknowledges that 
this limitation has not been met.  This limitation would appear to serve a very 
important purpose.  Without it, virtually any contract would be susceptible to 
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was lacking.  If ownership did not transfer because 
of the Khamovnichesky Court‟s conclusion, years 
after the fact, that the contracts were void under 
Article 179, that conclusion would appear to be a 
misreading of that provision of the Code, under 
which contracts are voidable upon the successful 
suit of the victim, but not void by order of the court 
sua sponte.   
 But even were the court to have concluded that 
it did have the power to declare these contracts void 
under Article 10, a power in no way specified there, 
it can hardly be claimed to have been foreseeable 
that the oil would then be deemed to have been 
entrusted to the defendants, especially given that the 
payment rendered under the contracts does not 
appear to have been returned.
60
  The relevant 
conduct, an exchange of oil for money, simply 
cannot be characterized as an entrustment to one of 
the property of another. 
3) The element of “theft.”  The court states that the 
contracts between Yukos and the three oil 
companies “obviously contradicted the interests of 
the latter” (p. 9), were procured by the defendants‟ 
misleading statements to the companies‟ 
shareholders and boards of directors (p. 9), and 
were “economically disadvantageous for them right 
from the start” (p. 10).  Even if true, the court notes 
                                                 
60
 Indeed, Article 10(2) states only that a court “may refuse to defend the right 
belonging to the person” who acted exclusively with the intention to cause harm 
to another, not that such conduct may serve as an element of the crime of 
misappropriation.  To the contrary, Article 10(3) establishes a legal presumption 
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that each contract established prices that were, in 
fact, paid for the oil.  It thus cannot be claimed that 
the defendants‟ actions amounted to the 
“uncompensated withdrawal and (or) conversion of 
someone else‟s property to the benefit of the 
perpetrator or other persons, which causes damage 
to the owner or other possessor of this property.”   
The court‟s theory appears to be that, using a variety of sham 
companies, the theft was accomplished “by means of the deliberate 
underestimation of the prices of oil” owned by the oil companies 
(p. 242).  The Court describes the defendants‟ “intent to embezzle 
someone else‟s property by means of clearly nonequivalent 
payment of its value.”  (p. 159)  The court makes frequent 
reference to its conclusion that the contracts “did not involve 
exchange for value” (e.g. p. 164, 167).  Because the court‟s theory 
of liability does not even track the elements of the offense, it 
cannot be held that it is “consistent with the essence of the offence 
and could reasonably be foreseen” by the defendants.  Moiseyev v. 
Russia, App. No. 62936/00 (6 Apr. 2009), at ¶ 234.  Indeed, it is 
hard to imagine a crime more unforeseeable than one that depends 
on a court‟s post hoc conclusions that the agreed contract price was 
not of quite the right amount.   
A second indication that this theory of embezzlement was 
unforeseeable is its sharp inconsistency with the decision of the 
Supreme Court interpreting these provisions of the Criminal Code.  
That decision not only upheld the importance of the elements that 
the court disregards but noted that an alternative provision of the 
Code was better suited to the court‟s conclusions of fraud.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in paragraph 6 of its decision, “[t]heft of 
another‟s property or the acquisition of the right to it by way of 
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this person of forged official documents that concede a right or 
free from responsibility qualifies as an aggregate crime, as 
foreseen by part one of Article 327 CC RF and the corresponding 
part of Article 159 CC RF.” The Supreme Court, in paragraph 8, 
further explained that,“[i]n the case of the creation of a commercial 
enterprise without the intention to actually conduct business or 
banking activity, which has the aim of theft of another‟s property 
or the acquisition of the right to it, its commission is completely 
covered by fraud [мошенничество].”  With regard to 
embezzlement, on the other hand, the Supreme Court reiterated the 
traditional statutory elements of the crime.  See paragraphs 18-20, 
Supreme Court decision, supra. 
Perhaps the Khamovnichesky Court sought guidance (although 
it does not say so) in the Supreme Court‟s decision interpreting 
embezzlement, which noted that “the partial reimbursement of 
damage to the victim by itself is not evidence of the absence of the 
person‟s intent for misappropriation or embezzlement of the 
property entrusted to him.”  (Para. 20, Supreme Court decision.)  
This, however, would be more weight than this short reference 
could bear.  It cannot be considered a foreseeable interpretation of 
either the statute or the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of it to 
equate poor business judgment about (or even fraudulently induced 
or ill-intentioned agreement to) a contract for the sale and purchase 
of oil with a partial reimbursement of damage due to 
embezzlement.   
In this regard, it is interesting to note that while the 
Khamovnichesky court sought such a novel theory under which to 
convict the defendants for embezzlement, it eschewed more 
straightforward applications of the Criminal Code.  The court 
frequently characterized the defendants‟ conduct in terms 






107 CRIMINAL CASE N 1-23/10 
Criminal Code: Article 165 (causing damage to property by fraud 
or breach of trust), Article 173 (creating a false business 
organization), Article 201 (abuse of authority), Article 204 
(commercial bribery), and Article 327 (forgery).
61
  However, the 
defendants were not indicted for these crimes and the court neither 
references these articles nor makes any concerted effort to show 
that their elements have been satisfied.  This may well be due to 
the fact that the statute of limitations for these crimes had passed.
62
  
The indictment also did not charge crimes for which the statute of 
limitations had not completely passed, e.g. the crimes of theft by 
an organized group [кража] under Article 158(3)(a) and fraud 
[мошенничество] by an organized group under Article 159(3)(a).  
Indeed, the Supreme Court made clear that “[i]n the case of the 
creation of a commercial enterprise without the intention to 
actually conduct business or banking activity, which has the aim of 
                                                 
61
 For example, the Khamovnichesky court states that the contracts with the oil 
producing companies “bore a fictitious character, inasmuch as they included 
within themselves knowingly false information” about both the price and the 
purchaser of the oil (p. 12).  The court concludes, “[i]n such a manner, by way 
of organizing the signing of the general agreements, M.B. Khodorkovsky, acting 
in coordination with P.L. Lebedev, did factually deprive the management of 
OAO Samaraneftegas, OAO Yuganskneftegas and OAO Tomskneft VNK of the 
opportunity to dispose of the oil produced by these companies on their own.” (p. 
13). 
62
 Under Article 78 CC RF, the statute of limitations for these crimes is six 
years, calculated from the date of the offense to the entry into legal force of the 
judgment.  If, as the court states, the defendants committed a “continuous crime” 
(see verdict, pp. 72, 678), this period would be calculated from 2003, the last 
alleged act of embezzlement.  It should be noted, however, that although an 
earlier version of the Criminal Code included “repeatedly” («неоднократно») as 
a possible element of the offense of embezzlement, see Article 160(2)(b) of the 
Criminal Code in its 7 July 2003 edition, the current Code omits any mention of 
this quality of the offense, and the Code itself does not provide for the concept 
of a continuing violation.  Article 16 of the Criminal Code, which governed the 
repeatedness of crimes («неоднократность преступлений»), was removed 
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theft of another‟s property or the acquisition of the right to it, its 
commission is completely covered by fraud.”  Nevertheless, no 
such charge was made against the defendants and the court makes 
no attempt to establish its elements other than to assert, in 




A third indication that the application of embezzlement to the 
defendants‟ business activities could not have been foreseeable 
may be the array of judgments by Russian courts to the contrary.  
This section of the verdict is difficult to assess.  According to the 
verdict, the defendants identified sixty-one judgments of the RF 
arbitration courts (p. 660).  Only two judgments are cited with 
particularity, both apparently including statements about oil owned 
by Yukos.  In addition to typographical errors in the 
Khamovnichesky court‟s references to them,64 it is impossible to 
know from the court‟s description whether the ownership in 
question refers to the contracts that are the basis of the charges 
against the defendants.  In any event, the Khamovnichesky court‟s 
verdict summarily dismisses the bulk of these unspecified 
judgments with the following conclusion:  
 
                                                 
63
 The court similarly asserts that the defendants‟ actions variously violated 
Article 1 of the RF Civil Code (p. 4), Article 10 of the RF Civil Code (p. 12), 
Article 83 para 3 of Federal Law No. 308-FZ On Joint-Stock Companies of 26 
December 1995 (as amended by Federal Law No. 65-FZ of 13 June 1996) (p. 
10), and Article 6 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Law of the RSFSR No. 948-1, “On 
Competition and the Restriction of Monopolistic Activity on Commodities 
Markets” of 22.03.91 (as amended by Federal Law No. 83-FZ of 25 May 1995) 
(p. 11).  The language of these statutes is not quoted, and no legal analysis is 
provided that applies facts proven in court to the relevant law. 
64
 The quotations made in the verdict from these commercial court judgments, as 
well as the quotation from the Constitutional Court judgment that appears on 
page 660 of the verdict, do not use complete quotation marks, making evaluation 
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Thus, it follows from those commercial court 
judgments that the oil passed on into de facto 
ownership of OAO NK Yukos; however, it was not 
the oil owner de jure.  In reality, the oil belonged to 
its producing subsidiaries.  In such circumstances, 
the court concludes that the commercial court 
judgments do not refute and do not affect in any 
way the establishment of the circumstances of 
commission of crimes in this case or the court‟s 
conclusions regarding the defendants‟ guilt and 
classification of their actions. (p. 660) 
 
The Khamovnichesky court also distinguishes these judgments 
by asserting that “As of the moment of issuance of the judgments 
mentioned by M.B. Khodorkovsky, the courts did not know the 
mechanism of theft of oil of OAO NK Yukos‟s oil-producing 
enterprises developed by M.B. Khodorkovsky, P.L. Lebedev, and 
other organized group participants.”  (p. 660-61)  It is impossible 
to assess the validity of this assertion, however, without evaluating 
the arbitration court judgments in question.  Such an evaluation, if 
completed, might further bolster the evidence of a violation of 
Article 7 in these proceedings. 
 
VI.  OTHER POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS   
 
Per the instructions communicated by the Council, this report 
focused its analysis on the verdict of the Khamovnichesky District 
Court and the official trial documents available via the website that 
the Council recommended.  On the basis of these documents, and 
primarily among these the verdict, it is possible to identify a 
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Human Rights.  Violations of Articles 3, 6, and 7 of the 
Convention have been analyzed in detail. 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that this report cannot be 
taken to provide an exhaustive list of violations arising out of the 
proceedings.  Because a proper examination of those other 
potential violations would require access to additional materials 
that have not been made accessible, and/or would require 
additional time that was not available, it is beyond the scope of this 
report to do more than note their existence in summary form.  To 
do so should not be taken as a sign of their lesser importance.  
Rather, this approach simply reflects the limitations identified 
above. 
Were resources available to conduct a thorough examination of 
the trial proceedings that are not accessible through an analysis of 
the verdict, several other articles would raise potential areas of 
inquiry.  For example, the court‟s decisions concerning the 
defendants‟ pre-trial detention raise issues under Article 5, which 
provides an array of procedural protections applicable to that stage 
of the proceedings but which are not susceptible to evaluation on 
the basis of the materials available.  Likewise, the right to respect 
for private and family life guaranteed by Article 8 may also be 
implicated by the treatment of the defendants.   
Similarly, Article 4 of Protocol 7 provides that “[n]o one shall 
be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings 
under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he 
has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with 
the law and penal procedure of that State.”  It is beyond the scope 
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In addition, several articles of the Convention contain multiple 
sub-parts.  Thus, Article 6 § 3 (b) guarantees the right to adequate 
time and facilities for a defence.  Evaluation of a claim that this 
right was violated in the defendants‟ trial would require access to 
substantially more materials than were available for the completion 
of this report.   
In addition to these core rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Convention, other articles of the Convention raise issues that are 
worth noting in conclusion. 
 
A.  ARTICLE 18 
 
Article 18 of the Convention provides: 
 
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to 
the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for 
any purpose other than those for which they have 
been prescribed. 
 
The European Court has noted more than once that Article 18 
“does not have an autonomous role.  It can only be applied in 
conjunction with other Articles of the Convention.”  Gusinskiy v. 
Russia, App. No. 70276/01, at ¶ 73.  That case concerned the 
                                                 
65
 Such a violation might be considered to manifest itself in “attaching a 
different legal qualification to the same facts rather than prosecuting the accused 
for a different set of facts.”  Rapporteur Mrs. Sabine Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger, Allegations of politically motivated abuses of the criminal 
justice system in Council of Europe member states, Report to the Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
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detention of the owner of ZAO Media Most (the holding company 
for the Russian television channel  NTV) at least in part to compel 
the transfer of his company to a state-controlled company.  Id. at 
¶¶ 75-76.  Perhaps because the violation in that case was so 
blatant, and because the Russian Government did not dispute the 
central facts around which the violation centered (the detention of 
the applicant in order to coerce the sale of his company to the 
state),
66
 the Court‟s description of the elements of a successful 
complaint under Article 18 were spare: “when considering the 
allegation under Article 18 of the Convention the Court must 
ascertain whether the detention was also, and hence contrary to 
Article 18, applied for any other purpose than that provided for in 
Article 5 § 1 (c).”  Id. at ¶ 74.   
This bare description deceptively suggests a low threshold to 
find a violation.  In prior applications to the European Court, the 
defendants and other parties associated with the defendants have 
asserted claims under Article 18.  See Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. 
No. 46468/06 (22 Dec. 2008) at ¶¶ 219-220; Khodorkovskiy v. 
Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (31 May 2011) at  ¶¶ 249-261; OAO 
Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04 (20 
Sept. 2011) at ¶¶ 663-666.  These claims all failed to attract the 
support of a majority on the Court.  In the first judgment, the Court 
concluded that although the complaint under Article 18 should be 
declared admissible, the disposition of the claims to which it was 
                                                 
66
 See id. at ¶ 75 (“The Government did not dispute that the July agreement, in 
particular Annex 6 to it, linked the termination of the Russian Video 
investigation with the sale of the applicant's media to Gazprom, a company 
controlled by the State. The Government did not dispute either that Annex 6 was 
signed by the Acting Minister for Press and Mass Communications. Lastly, the 
Government did not deny that one of the reasons for which Mr Nikolayev closed 
the proceedings against the applicant on 26 July 2000 was that the applicant had 
compensated for the harm caused by the alleged fraud by transferring Media 
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connected rendered its separate examination unnecessary.  See 
Aleksanyan v. Russia, App. No. 46468/06 (22 Dec. 2008) at ¶ 220.   
In Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, on the other hand, the Court made 
a determination on the merits.  The Court noted widespread 
suspicion of the motives of the Russian Government in prosecuting 
the defendants found in the resolutions of a variety of public and 
private institutions.  Included among these, and described as 
“probably the strongest argument in favour of the applicant‟s 
complaint under Article 18,” were the findings of a number of 
European Courts in cases concerning the Yukos oil company and 
its leadership.  Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (31 
May 2011) at ¶ 260.  Nevertheless, the Court found no breach of 
Article 18. 
In so doing, the Court set a high bar for complaints under 
Article 18.  First, the Court articulated a rebuttable presumption of 
good faith for all government action.  This translated into a 
requirement that the applicant “must convincingly show that the 
real aim of the authorities was not the same as that proclaimed (or 
as can be reasonably inferred from the context).”  Id.  at ¶ 255.  
Second, the Court stated that it would apply “a very exacting 
standard of proof” and that the burden of proof would remain with 
the applicant, notwithstanding the establishment of a prima facie 
case of improper motive.  Id. at ¶ 256.  Third, the Court 
characterized the applicant‟s claim to be that “the whole legal 
machinery of the respondent State in the present case was ab initio 
misused, that from the beginning to the end the authorities were 
acting with bad faith and in blatant disregard of the Convention.”  
Id. at ¶ 260.  Such a claim, the Court stated, “requires an 
incontrovertible and direct proof.”  Id.   
This last requirement, of “incontrovertible and direct proof,” 
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Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04 (20 Sept. 2011) at ¶ 663.  The 
Court acknowledged in a generic fashion the “massive public 
attention” and comments by “various bodies and individuals” 
concerning the proceedings against Yukos.  These, however, the 
Court found to be of “little evidentiary value.”  Id. at ¶ 665.  The 
Court stated that it could not find (apart from its previous findings 
of violations of the Convention earlier in the judgment) “any 
further issues or defects in the proceedings … [that] would enable 
it [to] conclude that there has been a breach of Article 18 of the 
Convention on account of the applicant company‟s claim that the 
State had misused those proceedings with a view to destroying the 
company and taking control of its assets.”  Id.  This part of the 
judgment was unanimous, perhaps reflecting the Court‟s holding 
(also unanimous) that at least some of the tax assessments did not 
violate Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention.   
In the past, the Court has noted that a violation of Article 18 
was theoretically possible even in the absence of a finding of a 
free-standing violation of a right protected by the Convention (a 
statement omitted from the Court‟s judgment, but found elsewhere, 
e.g. Gusinskiy v. Russia, App. No. 70276/01 (19 May 2004) at ¶ 73 
(“There may, however, be a violation of Article 18 in connection 
with another Article, although there is no violation of that Article 
taken alone.”)).  These judgments concerning the defendants and 
Yukos, however, suggest that the Court is not inclined to find a 
violation of Article 18 in association with complaints made under 
other articles of the Convention. 
 
B.  ARTICLE 34 
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The Court may receive applications from any person, 
non-governmental organization or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation 
by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights 
set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.  
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder 
in any way the effective exercise of this right. 
 
A number of circumstances could give rise to a violation of 
Article 34.  With regard to his first conviction, Khodorkovsky has 
filed two separate applications with the European Court.  In his 
first application, Khodorkovsky alleged that prison officials had 
interfered with his attorney‟s attempt to pass him a blank 
application form and other papers for use in perfecting his 
application to the Court. See the admissibility decision in 
Khodorkovsky v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04 (7 May 2009), at ¶ 9. 
The Court, while holding the application partly admissible, 
unanimously held this part of the application inadmissible.  Id.   
Khodorkovsky appears to have alleged a violation of Article 34 
in his second application to the Court, lodged on 16 March 2006, 
concerning the first trial.  The decision to communicate this 
application to the Russian Government was made on 15 November 
2007.  No decision has yet been announced regarding its 
admissibility in whole or in part.  The application alleged: 
 
access to the applicant's lawyers was especially 
restricted in the period leading up to the expiry of the 
six-month deadline for submitting his claim with 
regard to violation of his right to a fair trial; the 
authorities had refused to implement a Supreme 
Court decision allowing the applicant access to 
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possible to provide a copy of the present application 
in draft to the applicant to consider in his own time; 
four of the five lawyers instructed by the applicant to 
advise him in relation to his ECHR claim had been 
hindered in obtaining access to the applicant; and the 
applicant's two Russian lawyers, Mr Drel and Ms 
Moskalenko, had been subject to intimidatory 
actions by the State. Both had been threatened with 
disbarment and the International Protection Centre, 
which Ms Moskalenko founded, had been subjected 
to a tax audit of the entirety of its work.   
 
See Statement of Facts and Questions for the Parties compiled by 
the Registry of the Court in Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (No. 2) 
(App. No. 11082/06 communicated 3 December 2007) at § G.   
Additional information would be needed to determine whether 
such an allegation could be made with regard to the second trial. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 It is the conclusion of this report that the verdict in this case 
evidences the violation of the defendants‟ human rights protected 
under Articles 3, 6, and 7 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Other violations of the Convention are possible, including 
but not limited to violations of Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 18, 34, and 
Article 4 of Protocol 7.  However, evaluation of complaints raised 
under these parts of the Convention would require access to 
additional resources that were not available for this report. 
 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
